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logical and those in the form of actors' objectives.
It was found that CETA was the outcome of a broad compromise among the beliefs and objectives of actors, occurring in a particular historical context.
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How-

ever, the efforts of unions, educators, anti-poverty organizations and others to retain federal targeting on certain
client groups (as was common in the 1960s) were partly successful.

A federal commitment to public service employment

was also rea.f'firmed.

The result was that the Act shifted

employment and training policy significantly away from the
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discretion of elected state and local government officials.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 1913, President Richard M. Nixon
signed the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
into law.

It represented a major policy shift in federal

efforts at solving the problems of unemployment and underemployment.

CETA was an historic Act which helped pave the

way for new program forms.
Before CETA, a variety of federal attempts had been
made to prepare people for competition in the labor market
or provide jobs in hard economic times.

In 1917, Congress

established the federal-state Vocational Education program
(1, p. l).

The public works projects of the New Deal com-

prised another attempt.

In 1946, with the passage of the

Employment Act, the United States government formally
accepted responsibility for alleviating joblessness (2).
By the 1960s, employment and training had become a regular
item of concern at the national level, with annual expenditures for such programs climbing into the multi-billion
dollar range.

The phrase •employment and training,• itself

connotes the high position this area of policy now commands
on the country's agenda.

Over the past few decades, the

scope of these programs has widened sufficiently to push

2

the old term, •manpower,• with its narrower connotation, out
of common usage.
CETA was enacted in response to the need, apparent by
the late 1960s, for reforming the troubled employment and
training delivery system.

Many observers at the time felt

that the system was becoming unmanageable.

There seemed to

be too much duplication of erf ort and a general lack of coordination.

Programs were being administered by thousands

or contractors, both public and private, and federal rules
governing the use of funds prevented implementors from acting with flexibility under differing local conditions.
Proposals for reform arose, calling for decentralization of program control to state and local governments.

A

corollary concept of decentralization, which kept cropping
up in these proposals, was decategorization (i.e., a broadening of the discretion allowed to subnational implementors
in spending federally-granted funds and a removal of federal •strings• attached thereto).

The employment and

training system had been funded largely by categorical
grants-in-aid.

Under a categorical grant arrangement, fed-

eral money is given to state and local governments on the
condition that it be utilized in a relatively specific way,
with procedures, program operators and eligible clients
spelled out in the grant.

It was such constraints on grant

expenditures which frustrated many involved in implementation.

J
In addition to decentralization and decategorization,
reformers felt that programs should be consolidated under
the aegis of a single sporutoring authority in a given area
(preferably an elected state or local official).

The object

of consolidation was to give clients a wide choice of opportunities while only having to deal with one government
office.

To the reformers, this would fit well with a reduc-

tion of the role of federal bureaucrats and make the system
more efficient.

Overall coordination and policy guidance

could still be provided at the national level.
In order to effect such changes, any new employment
and training legislation would have to be comprehensive,
that is, it would need to include provisions for virtually
every type of program and clientele which could be realistically expected.

State and local program sponsors would be

required to handle the problems of the socially disadvantaged as well as those out of work temporarily because of
downturns in the business cycle.

Supportive services would

be necessary1 for example, transportation of clients to job
sites.

Sponsors would have to possess the information,

authority and funds appropriate for effective implementation.
CETA embodied all of the above reform ideas and was
thus historically important in two respects.

First, it was

one of the earliest efforts at transferring program control
from federal bureaucrats to state and local governments.
Secondly, it represented a unique attempt at comprehensively

4

overhauling the national system for delivering jobs and
occupational training.
Historical knowledge has value in that it may be
applied to current or future events.

Given that employment

and training continues to be a critical policy area, and that
CETA's enactment represents the last fundamental reform in
that area ( i.e., reform based on policy philosophy), analyses of future policy changes might be more successfully
executed in light of an understanding of the CETA tormulation.

It is the object of this thesis to furnish that under-

standing.

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT A?m TRAINING SYSTEM
For purposes of placing the 1973 reform in historical
context, a summary sketch of U.S. employment and training
programs is provided below.

It is not intended as an ex-

haustive listing, but rather to highlight the mile-posts in
the evolution of those programs.

Because its formulation

is the topic of this thesis, special emphasis is given to

CETA.
Aside from the establishment of the vocational education system in 1917, federal programs !or jobs and training
mainly date back to the New Deal.
efforts were1

Chief among New Deal

the public employment programs associated

with the Civil Works Administration of 193J, the Public
Works Administration of the same year and the Works Progress
Administration of 1935 (J, pp. 88-89).

Two other important

New Deal policy formulations were represented by the WagnerPeyser Act of 1933 which established the federal-state
employment service (for client referral and job placement),
and the Fitzgerald Act of 1937 which started a national
apprenticeship program (4, p. 11).

While the employment

service and the apprenticeship program (plus of course
vocational education) remained after the era of Franklin D.
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Roosevelt, the public works programs "disappeared with the
end of the Depression" ( 3, p. 89) •
In 1946, the Employment Act was passed.

It was con-

sidered a victory for liberals and organized labor.

For

the first time, the federal government accepted official
responsibility for reducing unemployment.

It was also sig-

nificant because it declared that labor supply and demand
would henceforth be taken into account in government economic policy (2).

Yet, the Act did not mandate anything in

the way of concrete job programs and was thus no more than
a statement of intent for employment and training.
That statement was not soon backed up with action.
late as 1961,

th~

As

federal employment and training system

consisted of the employment service, the apprenticeship program, vocational education and rehabilitation, and a farm
labor import program, at a total cost of approximately $250
million (5 1 p. 2).

Despite the praiseworthy intentions put

forth in the Employment Act, that system was basically the
one inherited from FDR (minus public service employment).
Problems such as technology-induced job dislocation and
urban economic stagnation were becoming more pronounced
every year, providing a clear stimulus to further federal
efforts in the 1960s.
Beginning in 1961, and continuing through both the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a new wave of programs
issued from Washington, D. C.

The Area Redevelopment Act

7

(ARA) of 1961 was aimed at economically depressed parts of
the country and disadvantaged clients, such as youth and
minorities.

It provided income, training and supportive

services for those clients (6, p. 1)21 7, p. 7).

The

Accelerated Public Works Act of 1962 authorized funding fora
••• the construction of job-producing public works
in 'depressed' areas eligible for ARA funds--as well
as those areas that had suffered over 6 percent unemployment during the previous twelve months
(7, p. 9).
The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was
originally intended as a remedy for job dislocation in an
increasingly automated economy.

It was amended over the en-

suing years in order to broaden its scope to include more
socially disadvantaged clients (5, p.

J). The "first real

examination of vocational education legislation since 1917"
occurred in 1963 (8, p. 311), when that training program was
updated.

The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), which was

"largely a package of manpower programs aimed at providing
jobs or preparing the employable poor for jobs," became law
in 1964 (5, p. 4).

Then, in 1967, a program of work incen-

tives, to help persons on welfare in finding jobs, was
created by amending the Social Security Act, originally enacted in 1935 (6, p. 132; 4, p. 11).

Beside legislation

with provisions establishing employment and training programs, the 1960s saw the passage of laws directly relating
to such programs.

For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act

contained titles to ensure "nondiscrimination in programs

8

assisted with federal dollars" as well as "equal employment
opportunity" (9, p. 169).
Programs of the 1960s, like those just mentioned, with
their anti-poverty emphasis, were often referred to as buildRoger H. Davidson (5,

ing blocks of a "Great Society."

p. 2) uses another phrase to describe those efforts.
refers to them as a "second New Deal."

He

In their discussion

of ARA and EOA, Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 132) states
"The acts established a new level of federal intervention in
labor market affairs, far beyond the vocational education
grants that had been instituted some 45 years earlier."

In

that decade, federal employment and training expenditures
rose permanently out of the range of hundreds of millions of
dollars and into the billions.

Davidson (5, pp. 2-J) sees

"meaning given to the Employment Act's commitment" in that
decade.
As stated above, CETA was a response to the unmanageabili ty of the categorical system.

Aside from the Emergency

Employment Act {EEA) of 1971, authorizing a two-year, antirecessionary public jobs program (10, p. 6), the early 1970s
was a time of legislative stalemate.

Various reform pro-

posals were debated and the result was CETA of 197), the
purpose of which was1
••• to provide job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantage, unemployed and
underemployed persons ••• by establishing a flexible
and decentralized system of Federal, State and local
programs (11, p. 42206).

9

As enacted, CETA consisted of six titles, the first of
which provided for basic grants to state and local government
"prime sponsors" for "Comprehensive Manpower Services."
Prime sponsors were defined ass

(a) state governments, (b)

general local governments of at least 100,000 population,
(c) consortia of general local governments containing a
member with 100,000 population, {d) general local governments (regardless of population) specially-designated by the
Secretary of Labor as exhibiting "exceptional circumstances,•
(e) certain general government and private grantees under
the existing Concentrated Employment Program {11, p. 42206;
12, p. J).

The authorized services under Title I included

virtually every conceivable employment and training activi ty1 from counseling and referral to training and directhiring (11, p. 42206).

Prime sponsors could carry out

these services on their own, or through other organizations
with which contracts could be concluded (lJ, p. 14).

Prime

sponsors were required to submit a services plan, for
approval by the Secretary of Labor, which had to ensure•
that the objectives of the Act would be met, that "to the
maximum extent feasible" low-income and other disadvantaged
persons would be served, that the "need for continued funding of programs of demonstrated effectiveness is taken into
account," that community organizations be involved in planning, that MDTA skills centers be used "to the extent
feasible" in institutional training, that arrangements be
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made for coordinating Labor Department-financed services
which relate to employment and training and that •planning
councils• be established in prime sponsorships to represent
local interest groups and act in an advisory capacity
(11, pp. 42206-71 13, p. 15).

State sponsorships were

charged with special responsibilities, such as the establishment of a "State Manpower Services Council" for representing
various interest groups within a state and for acting in an
advisory fashion like its local counterparts, and the development of a state plan for coordinating the activities of
state agencies in the implementation of prime sponsors'
plans (11, p. 42208), plus the choice of assisting vocational
education (supported by funds earmarked in CETA) via agreements to be made between state vocational education boards
and prime sponsors in whose areas this activity would occur
(11, p. 42209).

Eighty percent of Title I funds were subject

to a disbursement formulas

50~

of this money was to be

allocated among states (and then among sponsorships within
a state) according to the area's previous proportion of
federal employment and training assistance, 37.5% of this
money was to be allotted according to an area's proportion
of unemployed people, 12.5% according to the proportion
of adults in "low-income" families (11, p. 42207).

By "low-

income" was meant an annual income below $7,000 "with
respect to income in 1969," adjusted in proportion to changes
in the Consumer Price Index (ll, p. 42217).

In addition,

11
1% of the above funds were available for the Secretary of
Labor to allocate, based on the above formula, among states
to pay either for the State Manpower Services Councils or
state services (depending on a state's needs).

The remain-

ing funds under this title were designated for vocational
education (5% of Title I funds), state employment and training services (4%), the Secretary of Labor to promote local
sponsor consortia (up to 5%), and Secretarial discretionary
funds (at least

6%).

The last was to be used, first to

ensure that an area received at least 90% of the previous
year's funding, and secondly to "take into account the need
for funding programs of demonstrated effectiveness• (11,
p. 42207).

Finally, Title I contained procedural provi-

sions, most importantly specifying that Secretarial disapproval of sponsors' plans and actions (potentially resulting in loss of grant funds) be contingent upon findings
arrived at in a hearing, and that disapprovals are subject
to judicial review.

The Secretary was also authorized to

serve areas not being served by prime sponsors, either as
a consequence of disapproval or of a lack of a qualified
sponsor (11, pp. 42208-9).
Title II "Public Employment Programs" were authorized
to provide "transitional• jobs in public service to the unemployed and underemployed (11, p. 42209}.

Both Title I

prime sponsors and native American tribes on U.S. or state
reservations were eligible for Title II funding, if they
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contained "an area of substantial unemployment,• that isa
••• any area of sufficient size and scope to sustain
a public service employment program and which has
a rate of unemployment equal to or in excess of 6.5
per centum for three consecutive months as determined by the Secretary (11, p. 42209).
If a general local government of less than 100,000 population, but over 50,000, contained such an area, the sponsor
with jurisdiction was to designate that government as a
':Program agent• for public employment.

Program agents were

responsible for "developing, funding, overseeing, and monitoring programs" in the high-unemployment area, in congruence with the sponsor's application for federal assistance (which itself was to be a cooperative venture between
sponsor and agent (11, p. 42209).

Only persons living in

the high unemployment areas, and without a job for at least
30 days, could qualify as clients.

Also, "where appropri-

ate, training and manpower services related to such employment" and which were •otherwise unavailable,• were to be provided.

Furthermore, Title II jobs had to be in "needed pub-

lic services" (11, p. 42210).

This title also included

guidelines calling for special emphasis on veterans of
Indochina and Korea, as well as on those unemployed the
longest.

Other guidelines prohibited various administrative

and fiscal manipulations, such as substitution of Title II
money for other revenues.

The Secretary of Labor was also

authorized to review the implementation practices of sponsors

lJ
(11, pp. 42210-11).

Eighty percent of Title II disbursements

were to be made according to the proportion of unemployed
persons in each area of high unemployment relative to the
total number in all such areas, and the remaining 20% was to
be distributed at the Secretary of Labor's discretion "taking
into account the severity of unemployment within such areas"
(11, p. 42209).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly,

governmental (and tribal) recipients were allowed to decide
whether to apply Title II funds to public employment or any
other activity authorized by Title I or Title III-A
(11, p. 42211).
Title III Part A was the part of CETA under which the
Secretary of Labor was to operate employment and training
programs for "Special Target Groups," including youth,
offenders, persons of limited English-speaking ability,
older workers, native Americans and migrant and seasonal
farmworkers, as well as for areas suffering excessive unemployment, poverty or labor-supply problems (11, pp. 4221112).

While not all of the above classifications had pro-

grams spelled out for them, native American programs were
guaranteed a funding level equal to at least 4% of the sum
allotted under the basic Title I disbursement to prime
sponsors, and migrant and seasonal farmworker programs were
guaranteed an amount equal to at least
ment (11, p. 42212).

5% of that disburse-

Part B of Title III gave the Secretary

of Labor responsibility for a variety of research, demon-
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stration, evaluation and labor market information functions
(11, pp. 42212-13).
Title IV continued the Job Corps under the Department
of Labor (formerly authorized by EOA).

This program was

clearly targeted on •1ow-income disadvantaged young men and
women" and contained a host of procedural standards for its
implementation (11, 42213-171 13, p. 16).
The remaining two titles of CETA of 1973 contained
provisions which•

(a) established a National Commission for

Manpower Policy, to be comprised of representatives of six
· different federal departments and agencies as well as eleven
other personss
••• broadly representative of labor, industry, commerce, education ••• State and local elected officials ••• persons serv9d by manpower programs and of
the general public (to be] appointed by the President (11, pp. 42217-19),
and (b) set forth basic definitions and prohibitions for
CETA.

The Commission's task was to study employment and

training problems, conduct program evaluations and make recommendations to the President and Congress (11, pp. 42217-19).
After CETA was enacted, employment and training legislation tended toward a series of revisions or enhancements
of what came to be called the •cETA system" (10, p. 8).

In

1974, a new Title VI was added in order to expand public
job-creation in the face of continued recession (6, p. 133).
In 1976, CETA was amended to target more upon the socially
disadvantaged.

As a result, certain client eligibility
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requirements were tightened (8, p. 32J).

In 1977. the Youth

Employment and Demonstration Projects Act was passed, adding
Title VIII to CETA and providing several programs for younger
clients (8, p. 32J).

Also that year, tax incentive (10, p. 8)

and employer wage subsidy provisions (14, p. 172) were appended in hopes of easing hiring.

Then, in 1978, the year of

CETA's reauthorization, a new Title VII appeared.

It was in-

tended to increase the role of the business sector in employment and training (8, p. 323).

Additionally, 1978 saw a new

tax credit feature (10, p. 8) and tighter client eligibility
requirements tacked on (8, p. 32J).

The new eligibility

rules narrowed CETA's emphasis down to the more obviously
disadvantaged clients.

These rules, in combination with the

narrowing effects of the 1976 amendment, contributed to a
degree of •recategorization• of CETA (8, p. J2J).
In order to fully

un~erstand

the development of em-

ployment and training programs, it is important to grasp the
scale of those programs.

The dramatic increase in the

federal employment and training effort, beginning in the
early 1960s, can be illustrated in several ways, depending
upon the choice of definition.

Davidson's (5, p. 2) defini-

tion is a broad one, and includes the placement and referral
functions of the

u. s.

Training and Employment Service as

well as programs which are not simply under Department of
Labor (DOL) jurisdiction.

For example, vocational education

had traditionally been tied to the Department of Health,
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Education and Welfare (HEW).

According to Davidson (5, p. 2).

the cost of federally-sponsored employment and training
efforts rose from the above-mentioned $250 million in 1961
to about $4 billion by the end of that decade.

Eli Ginzberg

(10, p. )) assesses •employment and training, narrowly defined as programs under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Labor."

This is a useful definition, since DOL

has been the administrative focal point of programs designed
to remedy unemployment and underemployment.

According to

Ginzberg (10, p. )), appropriations climbed from $81 million
in 1963 to about $11 billion in 1979, a •130-fold increase."
Government statistics also portray this mushrooming
phenomenon.

Federal financial "obligations• and new client

enrollments for DOL employment and training programs,
cumulatively for 1963-66, came to approximately $1.2 billion
and 1,065,000 respectively.

In 1967 alone, these numbers

were about $0.8 billion and over 800,000.

In 1969, the

figures passed the $1 billion and one million persons marks,
and by 1973, the year of CETA's enactment, obligations were
over $2.75 billion and enrollments were at about 1,538,000
(15, p. 317).

During the late 1970s and early 1980s,

annual obligations ranged from about $5-10.6 billion, while
enrollments ranged from about 3.2 to over 4 million persons
(16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21).

The expansion of activities

under MDTA, one of the most important Acts of Congress in
this policy area, and one with programs administered by
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both DOL and HEW, provides another indication of growth.
Enrollments in these (primarily training-oriented) programs
started at about J4,ooo in 196J, and more than quadrupled in
two years (approximately 157,000 in 1965).

These enrollment

levels stood at over 200,000 per year until 1973 (15, p. 320)
when MDTA was replaced by CETA.- Annual appropriations
started at about $70 million, rising to the $400 million
range in the late 1960s (22, p. JJ).

Work and training pro-

grams of EOA, another key Act in this respect, displayed a
similar expansion, with appropriations nearly tripling between 1965 and 1969, approaching the $1 billion range

(4, p. 27).
In the 1970s, CETA had become the distinctive new
force in federal employment and training policy.

Speaking

only of "employment,• as opposed to training, Bruce K.
MacLaury (23, i) says that the 1970s "witnessed a dramatic
growth in federal support• for such programs.

According to

him a

Federal outlays for this purpose rose from less than

$1 billion annually in the early 1970s to an annual
average of about $7 billion in 1978-81. The vast

bulk of these expenditures was for public service
employment, primarily through grants to state and
local governments under the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (2,, i).

CETA's national administrative responsibilities were handled
primarily by DOL.

In fiscal 1975, the first full year of

CETA operations, DOL "Obligations for Work and Training
Programs" (emphasis added) stood at approximately $4.l

18
billion--nearly $4 billion of which went for CETA (24,
p. 339).

Through the rest of the 1970s and into the early

1980s, CETA's proportion of DOL work and training obligations was similarly higha roughly $5.9 billion out of $7.4
billion for fiscal 1978 (18, p. 364), $8.3 billion out of
$8.8 billion for fiscal 1980 (20, p. 257).

CETA's shares

of new enrollments were likewise high (16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 24).

The Act had become the umbrella under which policy

innovations took their place.
However, charges of waste and fraud made against CETA
had been accumulating in the late 1970s.

In an increasing-

ly budget-conscious and conservative atmosphere, that
spelled trouble for the "CETA system" (10, p. 8) and the
result was the 1981 elimination of the public employment
program.

Only training remained, at reduced levels of fund-

ing (25, p. 2519).

The Act which gave shape to federal em-

ployment and training assistance for nearly a decade was
relegated to the history books on October 1, 1983 (26,
pp. 68-9).

It was replaced by the Job Training Partnership

Act, which draws heavily upon the conceptual basis of CETA,
though emphasizing the roles of private industry and state
governments more so than its predecessor (27, p. 2428;
28, p. 968).

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
While seemingly countless, brief references to the

1973 reform are abundant.

Only eight treatments of the

subject capable of providing any insight into the factors
determining the legislative outcome exist.

Of these, five

touch upon the CETA formulation in the process of dealing
with broader topics and, as a result, lack the depth and
inclusiveness necessary to a complete understanding of that
formulation.

One piece, by Guttman (13), is a short assess-

ment of the implications of CETA for intergovernmental relations.

Another piece, by Levitan and Zickler (29),

while offering some clues as to how CETA was created, emphasizes what was created more so than how.

A discussion

by Culhane {JO) has the general subject of this paper as
its central theme.

Yet, while enlightening the reader

about phenomena leading to the 1973 legislation, it tends
more toward being a report on key bargaining sessions than
an extensive analysis of a policy formulation.

In spite of the dearth of information in the literature, with respect to the root causes of the CETA reform,
the above-mentioned writings provide guidance for a fuller
investigation.

Several developments of the late 1960s and
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early 1970s, pointing toward the enactment of CETA, were
consistently mentioned.

They werea

(a) the unmanage-

abili ty of the employment and training delivery system,
(b) the antipathy which the Nixon Administration had
aroused among many actors by its behavior, (c) the increasing need, by virtually all interested actors, to strike a
compromise, (d) the appeal which the concepts of decentralization and decategorization had acquired, (e) the need to
reconcile the opinion gap over the degree to which reform
should be anti-poverty oriented, (f) the need to reconcile
another opinion gap concerning the desirability of public
job-creation, and (g) the rise in influence of certain
groups, with respect to employment and training policy,
occurring concomitantly with a decline in such influence
for other groups.

Recognition of these developments helped

give form to the analytical framework of this thesis.

The

first three showed the importance of contextual elements.
The next three pointed up the relevance of ideas and beliefs,
and the last development called attention to the interplay
of group interests.
The unmanageability of the employment and training
delivery system toward the end of the 1960s is the object
of repeated treatment in the literature.

Mirengoff and

Rindler (Jl, p. 2) speak of the interagency competition for
resources and clients, the wasteful duplication of effort
and the inflexibility of a system based upon roughly 10,000
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individual projects.

Van Horn (J2, p. 77) mentions duplica-

tion of effort, interagency competition and inappropriate
services.

He characterizes the system as uncoordinated, by

stating, "Lacking any single coordinating authority, the
structure of employment and training programs in most communities before CETA was highly fragmented."

A report of the

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
(1, p. 1) describes the pre-CETA system for implementation
as "a patchwork of programs lacking a policy framework."
According to Culhane (JO, p. 51), the many categorical programs in an area were "uncoordinated" with the local labor
market.

These assessments are corroborated by Levitan and

Zickler (29) and Reagan and Sanzone (6).
That unmanageable system set the backdrop for the
policy revision to come.

However, the behavior of the Nixon

Administration, in general, and also specifically regarding
employment and training, helped catalyze reform efforts.
The general discontent is touched upon later in this paper,
but the employment and training aspect warrants attention
here.

Long advocating the decentralization and decategor-

ization philosophy, and frustrated by Congressional intransigence, the Nixon Administration (through the Department
of Labor) tried to change the delivery system via executive
order alone in 1973.

This action aroused anger in a host

of involved actors, stimulating efforts outside the Administration at devising a viable reform bill.

Culhane
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(JO, pp. 52-5J) reports that the actions of DOL, in this
respect, consituted an important stimulus for moving members
of Congress to act, and that state and local governments
"unanimously opposed changes in the program through a series
of executive actions.•

According to Van Horn (J2, p. 64),

state and local governments, operators of categorical programs and members of Congress all protested DOL's intentions vigorously.

The ACIR (1, p. 10) substantiates this

development.
A closely related development, receiving mention in
the literature, was the increasing need by participants in
employment and training to arrive at a compromise, yielding
viable reform legislation.

Culhane {JO, p. 55) reports that

two major employment and training laws (The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, and the Emergency Employment
Act of 1971) were ready to expire in mid-1973.

These laws

carried authorizations for categorical programs plus antirecessionary public hiring, which were considered of critical
value to many organizations and their Congressional representatives.

The pending expiration of these pieces of

legislation, along with the threatened actions of DOL, stimulate legislative activity on Capitol Hill "in consultation
with the administration" (1, p. 10).

The end result was a

comprehensive replacement bill {CETA), which was a "compromise," and one in which "a Presidential veto could be
avoided" (1, p. 16).

Van Horn (32, p. 64) describes
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pressures to compromise being exerted upon both pro-categorical members of Congress (and their constituents) .!!!!_ the
Nixon Administration.

According to this account, the Admin-

istration finally ceased its threatened executive imposition
of reform and conceded some categorical provisions in CETA,
plus public employment (which it had opposed), in return for
Congressional acceptance of decentralization and decategorization.
While many groups were averse to the methods of the
Nixon Administration, not all of them disagreed with its
goals of decentralization and decategorization--as long as
these goals were realized via legislative means.

Gradually,

more and more participants in the employment and training
system came to embrace these ends as appropriate remedies
to the system's shortcomings.

Culhane (JO, p. 52) empha-

sizes that support for decentralization and decategorization
was significant among state and local government officials.
The ACIR (1) corroborates this point.

According to Levitan

and Zickler (29, p. 191), these reform goals had broad
appeal, as evidenced by the "bi-partisan" Congressional support for them.

~irengoff

and Rindler (Jl, pp. 127-128) out-

line the basis of the broad appeal of the reform ideas by
informing the reader that a much wider clientele population
could be served under a decategorized setup.
However, it was just that kind of intimation which
frightened representatives of the poor and socially
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disadvantaged.

These people felt that only federally-

formulated and enforced rules would guarantee their constituents a fair shake.

Hence, they were disturbed at the

prospect of turning control over to states and localities.
The possible loss of redistributive potential (i.e., an antipoverty purpose) in employment and training programs was what
caused them to take a strong interest in the pending reform.
That CETA was influenced by these groups, who fought a rearguard action at the time, is a fact born out by the literature.

Mirengoff and Rindler (31, pp. 112-115) report that

such organizations saw a "threat" in decentralization and
decategorization, though the same authors indicate that CETA
partly embrace4 the interests of these groups.

The ACIR

(1, p. 11) also mentions the anti-poverty element, by noting
that during the reform debate "some sentiment was voiced in
favor of retaining at the national level certain specialized
programs," for the poor and disadvantaged minorities.

The

same study concludes that, while CETA did take significant
account of the above sectors of the population in its language, the compromise quality of the bill "contributed to
uncertainties about how the act would be implemented"
(1, pp. 17-18).

In Van Horn's opinion (32, p. 157), Con-

gress walked a "tightrope" between redistributive and distributive (i.e., broad subsidy, without a clear an:ti-poverty
focus) considerations in formulating CETA.

Yet, Van Horn

(32, pp. 156-159) concludes that the outcome leaned more to
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the distributive side of that tightrope.

Ripley and

Franklin (9, pp. 172-176) and Levitan and Zickler (29,
pp. 193-4) agree with Van Horn that anti-poverty groups and
others representing the disadvantaged influenced CETA, but
not enough to be considered winners in the final outcome.
Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 135) express more confidence in
the Act's capacity to address the problems of the disadvantaged.

Those authors interpret some of CETA's language as

being "a euphemistic way• of warning state and local officials not to neglect anti-poverty and related organizations.
Another development found consistently in the literature, which fueled the reform debate, was the issue of
public job-creation for the immediate alleviation of unemployment.

According to Ripley and Franklin (9, p. 174),

liberals were traditionally in favor of public employment,
and conservatives were traditionally against it.

Culhane

(JO, pp. 52-55) describes public employment as a question
over which Congress and the Nixon Administration disagreed
in a most fundamental way, and which was resolved by a compromise whereby such a program would be an allowable activity.
However, a subnational government could allocate funds between it and other activities at its own discretion.

Van

Horn (32, pp. 6J-64) depicts the Administration as deeply
opposed to the very idea of public job-creation.

In his

opinion, the White House came to see a concession on this
issue as a useful tactic in extracting from Congress an
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approval of decentralization and decategorization.

Finally,

in Guttman's (lJ, p. 13) opinion, public jobs advocates won
a •deceptive" victory because of the Act's granting of the
discretion referred to by Culhane above.
The final development, during the late 1960s and
early 1970s mentioned as significant to CETA's formulation,
was the ascendance of certain groups' influence on employment and training occurring concomitantly with the descendence of the influence of others.

Mirengoff and Rindler

(Jl, p. 48) speak of the gradually improving status of state
and local governments in this substantive area.

In the

estimation of these writers, state and local governments
were advancing their capacities for implementation during
that period (e.g., their planning capacities).

According to

this source (31, p. 103), the federal-state employment service was suffering from image problems in the 1960s.

Spe-

cifically, the service was seen by many as being an old-line
agency which was out of touch with the needs and values of
poverty community clients.

As a result, the service was

losing influence in this policy area.

The same authors (Jl)

also imply that vocational and general educators, as well as
established anti-poverty organizations, had been losing the
preeminent positions in employment and training policy which
they had once enjoyed (for a variety of reasons).
general,

Mire~off

In

& Rindler (31) reveal that subnational

general governments (cities and counties in particular)
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succeeded in supplanting the above groups, in terms of control over implementation, with the passage of CETA.
Culhane (JO) implies that state and local governments {especially counties) had gained greater influence in the employment and training system, while anti-poverty agencies lost
some, as evidenced by the provisions enacted in CETA.
The other literature sources included in this review
all contain references corroborating Mirengoff and Rindler
(Jl) and Culhane (JO).

In effect, these references indi-

cate that state and local general governments gained administrative territory in the formulation process, while antipoverty organizations, educational agencies and the federalstate employment service all lost some (1, 6, 9, lJ, 29, 32).
The main reason for this power shift was a double-edged one.
On one hand, state and local general governments were improving their capabilities and willingness to implement
policy in an area where they had little prior experience.
That lack of experience meant that those governments had
little in the way of a reputation, good or ill, in employment and training, and thus appeared as fresh alternatives
in the search for better system management.

On the other

hand, the "losers" all had implementation experience prior
to CETA, but were, therefore, vulnerable to charges of fault
in the on-going criticism of the system.

Hence, they ap-

peared less trustworthy.
To sum up, the literature consistently mentioned
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certain developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s
(outlined in the first paragraph of this review) which were
of significance to the direction of reform.

It was the

recognition of these developments which guided this author
in the further investigation of CETA's formulation.

The

combination of knowledge gained, from the above literature
and that further investigation, then led to the establishment of the analytical framework of this thesis.

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
There do not appear to be any standard, well-defined
methods for studying the formulation of public policy.

Some

authors emphasize the roles of individuals, other emphasize
the roles of organizations.

Some adhere to a strict chro-

nology, while others jump between points in time.

Thus, it

seemed appropriate to first look at the information available in the enactment of CETA, and then develop an analytical framework which would fit that information.
sense, the approach taken is an empirical one.

rn this
Upon examina-

tion of the literature and documents on CETA's formulation,
three major categories of factors contributing to the legislative outcome were discerneda

(a) contextual, (b)ideologi-

cal, and (c) actor objectives.

Hence, the analytical frame-

work for this paper is broken down into these three classifications of contributing factors.
In order to fully apply the findings of this thesis,
to current or upcoming formulations of employment and training policy, one must place equivalent factor categories from
each time period alongside each other, and compare differences and similarities.

Since the study of policy formula-

tion knows no broadly accepted frame of analysis, it is
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likely that the breakdown used in this paper will not be
exactly duplicated in studiee of current or future policy
formulations.

For example, a student of current policy may

find "institutional factors• to be an appropriate category,
rather than ideological factors.

Nevertheless, it is felt

that the approach taken here would remain useful in comparative application for two reasons.

First, this approach was

derived from an investigation of a process which involved the
whole gamut of issues and forces relevant to employment and
training policy formulation.

Many of these issues and forces

have remained basically the same since the early 1970s.

For

example, public job-creation is an issue which is as unresolved now as it was ten years ago.

Therefore, a good chance

exists that an analysis of current or future formulation in
this area might closely agree with the frame-work of this
thesis, making a direct, or nearly direct, comparison of
li~e-factors

possible.

Secondly, even if a study of current

or future formulations is organized along quite different
lines, there is liable to be room for modification to facilitate comparative analysis.

So, for instance, if the hypo-

theti.cal student above considers •institutional factors" to
be analytically useful, a comparison with the findings of
this paper might be done by clarifying the institutional
phenomena associated with the factors used here.

Conversely,

the context, ideologies and/or objectives associated with
the "institutional factors" in the hypothetical study might

Jl
be elucidated.
As stated above, an empirical approach was taken in
developing the analytical format for this paper.

The first

step was to search the scientific and general literature for
initial clues.

Some treatments of CETA's formulation were

located in short articles, others in books dealing with employment and training policy or American government.

These

helped to lay a conceptual foundation in this author's mind.
The second empirical step was to investigate additional data
sources, guided by the knowledge gained from the literature.
These additional sources were both primary and non-primary
in character and were selected with an eye toward better defining the C!TA formulation in terms oft

(a) its overall

historical position, and (b) its place in the political
arena of the early 1970s (i.e., the status of the pending
reform with respect to relevant organizations, institutions,
political parties, etc., at the time).
The primary sources most heavily relied upon included•
(a) records of hearing testimony on employment and training
reform, conducted before committees of the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives in 1973, (b) letters and position
statements submitted to members of Congress and the Nixon
Administration, which were attached as evidence to the hearing testimony, and (c) texts of Senate and House discourses
on reform, found in the Congressional Record, mostly from
the summer and autumn of 1973.

It was decided that the

~

examination of Congressional documents should be confined to

1973 because the literature indicated that, prior to that
year, the positions of interested actors had been too far
apart to have allowed anything resembling the CETA compromise bill to have been produced.

It was not until 1973 that

policymakers and their constituents decided that obtaining
passable legislation was a higher priority than satisfying
some of their earlier demands.

In that year, a fresh start

was made on all sides of the issue, positions were significantly moderated and CETA was conceived.

CHAPTER V

THE CONTEXT OF REFORM
The environment in which CETA was born was characterized by three policy-relevant factors which affected reform
proceedings.

These factors consisted ofa

(a) employment

and training system constraints which became apparent from
experiences with the programs of the 1960s and pre-CETA
reform attempts, (b) the political climate of the late
1960s and early 1970s, distinguished by antagonistic relationships between the Nixon Administration and various
actors, as well as a declining faith in the ability of the
federal government to solve problems, and (c) the state of
the national economy in the early 1970s.

Each of these

factors will be discussed below, with respect to the ways
in which they affected the direction of employment and
training reform.

SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS
The heightened activism of the federal government in
employment and training matters during the 1960s led to the
establishment of a delivery system which was rich in complexities and contradictions.

The wave of employment and

training programs of the 1960s can be seen as a collection
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of separate responses, on the part of the government, to
various interest groups (e.g., those representing organized
labor or racial minorities) calling for accomodation of
particular needs.

Levitan (8, pp. 316-317) describes those

programs as having been, in effect, thrown at problems by
lawmakers loyal to specific constituencies.

It is not sur-

prising then, that the delivery system inherited by the
Nixon Administration and the reformers of the early 1970s
defied common conceptualizations of rationality or efficiency.
There was an overall lack of coordination in the system, evidenced by two noticeable symptoms.

Duplication of

effort by many service deliverers in a given area was one
symptom.
resources.

Such a phenomenon is, by definition, wasteful of
It would inevitably require more federal money,

supervision and technical assistance (not to mention nonfederal resources) to keep several different agencies operating similar programs in a community, than it would to have
a single agency handle the job.

Separate organizations must

have separate systems for financial accounting, personnel
management, public relations, etc.

That would be true even

if the involved agencies did not see each other as competitors.

However, those participating in the "second New Deal"

(5, p. 2) did often see each other that way (the second
symptom).

The result was an increased level of waste, from

a societal standpoint, due to the expenditure of additional
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resources on activities associated with inter-agency competition.

For example, agencies in such a situation must spend

time and money on building their image in the eyes of the
public or government officials in order to be awarded grant
funds which are too scarce to go around to every similar
agency.

Another example of such waste would be the withhold-

ing of information pertinent to a substantive policy area-information which might conceivably be shared in a more efficient way.
Such was the uncoordinated employment and training
system of the 1960s.

The system was based upon at least

10,000 individual projects (Jl, p. 2) involving the federal

government and various implementors, the latter including
community action agencies*, union locals, civil rights organizations and a host of other non-governmental entities, plus
subnational governments, general and vocational educators
and the

u.s.

Training and Employment Service.

Yet, with all

that exertion of administrative effort, the system still had
holes into which clients fell, unable to obtain jobs or
training.
Ironically, the system which was so "highly fragmented" (32, p. 77), was also overly-centralized.

The categori-

cal programs of the 1960s were creatures of Congressional
*CAAs1 locally-based anti-poverty organizations,
originally under the aegis of the federal Office of Economic
Opportunity, authorized by the EOA of 1964 (5, pp. 4-5a
9, pp. 156-161).

J6
legislation, modified by administrative regulations.

DOL

and HEW were responsible for promulgating most of those regulations and for guiding implementation through regional
offices.

Between legislative provisions "targeting" certain

groups as clients and service providers, and operational
rules and program approval procedures, the categorical programs were relatively restrictive.

For example, a city

government receiving grant funds might only have been allowed to spend them on training welfare recipients for particular kinds of jobs.

For reasons like this, complaints devel-

oped to the effect that employment and training programs were
being controlled by officials who were out of touch with the
nuances of local situations.

In addition, matching fund

obligations were common, requiring state or local governments to invest their own revenues into projects funded by
Washington to obtain a grant.

These impositions of national

priorities upon subnational jurisdictions led many participants in the employment and training programs of the 1960s
to object to the "straightjacket effect" (8, p. Jl7) of
categorical programs.
Recognition of these shortcomings of the categorical
system gave rise to

thin.~ing

about how to revise it.

thinking followed two general conceptual linesa

That

first, the

system had to be made more efficient1 secondly, it had to
be made more responsive to the varying conditions of
different geographical areas.
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Ideas for improving the efficiency of the system aimed
at eliminating the wasteful duplication of effort, interagency competition and confusing plethora of regulations.
The notion of consolidating programs under a fewer number of
administering authorities was the most significant idea in
this respect.

While many different organizations in a given

community would still be required for supplying the services
and resources needed, tying them all together under the
auspices of a single program sponsor was expected to yield
better coordination.

Given this kind of change, it was felt

that many unproductive agencies would be weeded out of the
system, and competition for contracts would result in the
most able deliverers of particular services being the ones
given the job by a sponsor.

Competition would be kept out-

side the system, with only the winners taking their places
inside the system, performing the functions for which they
were best suited.

Simplification of administration would be

possible by reducing the number of federal grant recipients.
In order to make the system more responsive, authority
would have to be devolved from the national to the state and
local levels (decentralization).

Reform thinking tended to

emphasize the roles of elected officials of subnational
general governments, working on the assumption that these
were better attuned to the needs of their citizens than were
federal officials.

In addition, discretion as to acceptable

uses of funds would have to be increased (decategorization)
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for grant recipients.

This logic implied that, with respect

to clients, providers and local conditions, it was state and
local elected officials who knew best what to do,

Working

together with representatives of business, labor, the disadvantaged and established government agencies (e.g., vocational schools) in a given geographic area, elected officials
were expected to develop a set of programs which would be
more responsive to that area's idiosyncracies.
While the above reform ideas gained a large following
in a few years' time, they also provoked opposition from many
on ideological grounds and were perceived as threatening to
established interests.

Liberals saw them portending a fed-

eral retreat from the established practice of guaranteeing
special consideration for the disadvantaged (something they
did not believe subnational officials could be trusted to
do),

Operators of categorical programs feared a new system

in which their role would come into question as subnational
governments exercised discretion on matters of program content and service-provider contracting.

Beyond that, even

persons who agreed with the reform ideas had their differences with respect to how to actualize those ideas.

The em-

ployment and training system was composed of a heterogeneous
mixture of groups and it was apparent that the ability to
compromise would be a useful talent as reform proceedings unfolded.

There was much to be learned about applying the

reform concepts, and the experiences of several years of
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pre-CETA attempts at doing so served to expand such knowledge.
Enough enthusiasm for reform, along the lines just
described, had built up {among state and local officials,
ideological conservatives and federal executives) by the end
of the Johnson Administration to make preliminary moves possible in 1967.

That year saw Secretary of Labor Willard

Wirtz establish the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP)
{,, p. 6).

Patricia Marshall had the following to say

about CEPa
Its goal was to pull together diverse programs at
the local level under a single prime sponsor ••• and
focus all resources upon defined areas of concentrated need. The CEP's generally were located in
urban and rural poverty pockets, where manpower
needs were extensive and complex. Usually, a community action agency was the prime sponsor for each
CEP, and it .subcontracted with specialized agencies
to get the training, health, job placement, and
other services disadvantaged clients need to obtain
work. In other instances, units of general government were the prime sponsors of CEP (12, p. J).
Marshall (12, pp. J-4) goes on to mention some of the problems with CEP.

One was that it was implemented in a hurry,

without careful attention to planning.

Another was that an

attempt was made to staff CEP with persons from the poverty
communities intended to be served.

Marshall implies that a

lack of staff ties to the business sector was significant
in limiting CEP's potential.

Finally, CEP could not evolve

into a system of areawide dimensions due to its focus upon
relatively small target communities.
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Another reform attempt in 1967 was the Cooperative
Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS).

This was a multi-

layered planning structure, comprised of committees representative of implementing agencies at the local, state and
regional levels (5, pp. 6-7).

However, these CAMPS

commit-

tees never acquired sufficient authority to effect changes
in the system, and served only as focal points for exchanging ideas (12, p. 4s 5, pp. 6-7).
In 1969, with Richard Nixon in office, the drive for
reform picked up steam.

The new President directed DOL to

draw up a Manpower Training Act.

It featured a strong state

role, but was apparently too extreme in its degree of decentralization, not only for a Democratic (and mostly pro-categorical) Congress, but even for state officials.

Unsure

about the whole thing, the latter failed to rally behind the
Administration and the Manpower Training Act died from a
lack of political support (5, pp. 18-29).

Also in 1969, the

Administration was pursuing a non-legislative route.

It con-

sisted of providing planning grants to state and local governments in order to build up their self-sufficiency in employment and training (12, p. 4).

This proved to be an

insightful move by the Administration.

The improvement of

state and local expertise in this policy area later turned
out to be important in swaying opinions in favor of decentralization and decategorization (JJ, 34).

By 1973, those

planning grants had reached a total of $16 million
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(12, p. 5) and were going to 126 cities, 50 states, four
counties and 19 native American Tribes (8, pp. 318-319).
The 1970s began with a Presidential veto of a reform
bill which had been passed by Congress and aimed at making
the employment and training system more flexible, but containing a fatal flaw from a legislative standpoint--a public
jobs provision.

President Nixon was too strongly opposed to

public job-creation to sign the bill (10, p. 6).

However,

that impasse only slightly dampened reform efforts.

The Ad-

ministration pursued reform on both the legislative and bureaucratic fronts.

It proposed another billa

Revenue Sharing Act of 1971.

the Manpower

That bill, like the earlier

Administration proposal, died because it offended Congress
with notions like the allocation of funds by entitlement
(instead of the usual application for DOL approval), the
elimination or matching requirements, and an overall reduction of the federal role in implementation (l, pp. 8-9).

On

the bureaucratic front, CAMPS was revised in 1971 to broaden
the membership of its committees to include a greater variety of interests and give them more authority with respect
to the determination of areal needs.

Additionally, DOL of-

fices were told to "base their funding actions on [committee]
plans as much as possible," and to expect that, by 1974,
state and local plans would be treated as "funding directives" (12, p. 4).
The Emergency Employment Act (EEA) was passed in 1971
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(8, p. 315), and was significant for two reasons.

First it

represented a Nixon Administration concession, allowing public employment, to cope with rising unemployment due to a
recessionary economy (authorized at $2.25 billion for two
years).

Secondly, it represented a Congressional concession,

allowing a major increase in the discretion of state and
local governments, who were to implement it (8, p. 315).

Ac-

cording to Mirengoff and Rindlera
It was not until passage of the Emergency Employment
Act (EEA) of 1971 that government units (states,
cities, counties) were given direct control over the
funding and operation of a major manpower program.
EEA thus constituted a stepping stone in the decentralization of manpower programs (Jl, p. 69).
An initiative taken by the Administration, in 1973,
which complemented (on a smaller scale) the EBA experience,
was the setting up of pilot projects known as Comprehensive
Manpower Programs (CMPs).

DOL officials selecteda

••• three States (South Carolina, Utah, and New
Hampshire), Luzerne County [PaJ, and five cities
or consortia of local governments whose boundaries
were roughly congruent with a labor market area •••
(12, p. 8),
to act in a prime sponsor capacity.

In the CMPs, categori-

cals originally authorized under MDTA and EOA were "phased
into" the pilot prime sponsorships.

This was done either

through choosing specific grants whose contract time was expiring, or through negotiation with the state and local governments involved.

However, this DOL effort became obsolete

when CETA was passed at the end of the year (12, pp. 8-9).

4J
By 197J, however, the Nixon Administration had become
so frustrated with Congressional stubbornness about allowing
decentralization and decategorization, that it decided to go
for reform via the bureaucratic route only.

DOL had been

preparing a plan for instituting overall decentralization,
decategorization and consolidation through administrative
rule changes.

The White House and DOL seemed intent on ex-

ecuting the plan if comprehensive legislation was not forthcoming.

Consisting of the same reform concepts already dis-

cussed in this paper, such as state and local government
prime sponsorships (33, pp. 280-281), the plan infuriated an
assortment of actors outside the Administration.

This at-

tempted executive action was perceived as intolerable by
members of Congress, state and local governments, and operators of categorical programs alike (32, p. 64).

Procedur-

ally, it was considered by many to be an outrageous, and
possibly illegal, abuse of executive powers.

However, it

appears that the plan was mainly intended to pressure Congress into a legislative compromise.

Late in 1973, break-

throughs in negotiations between the Administration and
Capitol Hill, on a comprehensive bill, began to be made.
Accordingly, DOL shelved the executive strategy {JO, pp.

54-55).
What was learned by those interested in employment
and training, from the above reform attempts, with respect
to h.Q!! best to decentralize, decategorize and consolidate?
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The CEP experience was the point of origin for the
prime sponsor idea.

However, CEP prime sponsorships were

too narrow; internally in their staff makeup, and externally
in their jurisdictional scope.

Poverty community personnel

alone were not sufficient because, in order to operate a consolidated local system, business, labor, government and other
sectors would have to be brought into the picture.

Limiting

sponsorshipa• jurisdiction to a small target location (in
this case, "urban and rural poverty pockets") was also inadequate.

This was because such locations seldom account

for the entirety of labor market dynamics in an area.

Final-

ly, the CEP experience reminded participants of the old
adage, "haste makes waste," by pointing up the importance of
the careful consideration of strategy, prior to starting a
new program.
CAMPS taught a lesson of a different kind.

The initial

lack of authority on the part of its planning bodies made
those bodies impotent.

However, in its capacity as a forum

for the exchange of ideas and raising of issues, CAMPS helped
educate subnational officials as to the operation and coordination of employment and training programs.
The lessons learned from the pre-CETA reform efforts
made by the Nixon White House and DOL were both political
and administrative in nature.

On the political side, it was

made clear, by negative Congressional responses to early legislative proposals, that drastic changes could not be imposed
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upon existing circles of interest.

Extensive devolution of

program control to state and local governments, even through
legislation, was simply too much for many constituencies to
bear.

Successful legislation would have to be more moderate,

providing for some decentralization and decategorization, but
leaving enough targeting and federal control intact to satisfy interest groups who felt the latter were necessary.

Also,

executive action without legislation was too alarming for
many.

While DOL's executive action plan seemed mainly in-

tended to stimulate Congress into a compromise on comprehensive legislation, the Administration appeared to this author
as quite ready to forge ahead without a bill.

Yet, once op-

position to such an intention built up momentum, it became
clear that a wholly bureaucratic approach to reform was politically impossible.

In terms of administrative lessons,

DOL's gradual fostering of the technical capacities of subnational governments helped to make those units appear to be
ready to handle sponsorship responsibilities (12, 33, 34).
The "hands-on" practice which subnational governments
experienced under EEA and the pilot CMPs, was indispensable
for the decentralization process.

Marshall (12, p. 6) cites

the involvement of states and localities in fund distribution, job-creation and staff recruitment and training under
EEA as significants

"In many localities, [EEA's public em-

ployment program] was the only manpower program elected officials were directly familiar with."

The CMPs were helpful
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to the extent that they provided "a testing ground for administrative systems and procedures for a further decentralized effort,• and "experience in dealing with a variety of
problems, given the various forms of government, multijurisdictional arrangements, staff capabilities, areas to be
served, and the like," which reform would have to take into
account (12, p. 8).
Finally, DOL itself learned much about what would or
would not fly, during the course of preparing state and
local sponsors for greater responsibility.

That activity

involved the Department's national and regional offices in
disseminating information, developing guidelines for program
operation and coordinating various governmental entities in
anticipation of a coming system overhaul (12, p. 9).
The totality of the experiences of the "second New
Deal" (5, p. 2) and pre-CETA reform attempts educated participants in implementation as to the systemic constraints
within which reform could be realized.
not arise in a social vacuum.
fluence their development.

However, programs do

Broader political trends in-

In the next section, such trends

are examined in order to understand their impact upon the
reform process.

POLITICAL CLIMATE
The years in which employment and training reform
developed were characterized by a great deal of antagonism
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between the Nixon Administration and various other actors,
especially Congress.

The Administration's methods of re-

lating to Congress were often perceived by members of the
latter institution as worthy of scorn.

The Administration

was seen as uncooperative and insufficiently concerned with
Congressional sentiment.

As Randall B. Ripley statesa

President Nixon and his
relations with Congress
gress felt it was being
nored as Nixon tried to
goals (35, p. 305).

closest advisers had poor
much of the time. Conpushed around and/or igaccomplish hid policy

Particularly irksome to Senators and Representatives, was
the Administration's penchant for circumventing the legislative branch entirely.

Members of Congress felt insulted

by executive actions, like the one pertaining to employment
and training policy, or, more spectacularly, like the ones
associated with the Watergate affair.

Ripley substantiates

this a
Thus when the Watergate scandal broke, congressional opinion was that now Congress could and
would recoup both lost prestige and power. The
Watergate affair provided the opportunity for
Congress to reassert itself, but such a move
would have occurred even without Watergate, for
many members of Congress indicated that President
Nixon and the White House staff had gone too far
in trying to legislate without Congress (35, p.

305).

In addition to its methods of relating to Congress,
beliefs underlying the Administration's approach to the rest
of the government implied potential conflict.

Charles

o.

Jones (')6, pp. 230-231) assesses those beliefs by informing
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readers that President Nixon only .felt accountable to the
majority of voters who had elected him to office, not to
Congress or other institutions.

Jones (36, p. 230) elabo-

rates upon the President's philosophy by bringing attention
to his conservatisma

•As a Republican with a Democratic

Congress and a New Deal bureaucracy, Nixon was, in his view,
mandated to fight the good fight, against overwhelming odds.•
Many groups outside of federal institutions experienced conflicting relationships with the Administration too.
In that era, which witnessed battles over executive impoundment of funds, war powers and cuts in social programs, the
Administration's priorities and tactics aroused consternation
aplenty.

Ripley & Franklin (9) report numerous cases of con-

troversy between the Administration on the one hand, and
liberals, organized labor and foreign policy "doves• on the
other.

Those controversies often concerned basic budgetary

priorities and long-term social objectives.

The case of

President Nixon's attempt to liquidate one of the bulwarks
of the 1960s War on Poverty (the Office of Economic Opportunity--OEO}, illustrates the profundity of such conflictsa
In 1973 Nixon appointed andacting director of OEO
(without Senate confirmation) specifically to dismantle the agency and to transfer certain of its
programs to other agencies. At the same time, he
sent his budget for fiscal year 1974 to Congress.
In it no money was requested for OEO as an agency
(although it was authorized through June of 1974}.
The budget proposed placing OEO's legal services in
a separate corporation, transferring certain OEO programs to other agencies ••• and allowing the comm.unity
action programs to expire with no request for any
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funding at all. This executive action sent threatened community action agencies and employee unions
to the courts, where a judge ruled that no budget
message could overrule a legislative authorization.
The actions of the acting director were declared
null and void, and he was declared to be illegally
appointed (9, pp. 160-161).
Another characteristic of the political climate, during the period of employment and training reform, was that
the faith of the 1960s in the federal government as a problem solver had seriously deteriorated.

Conservatives, and

even some liberals, were becoming critical of the illogic of
federal rules.

Many of the categorical programs of the 1960s

were being attacked as harbors of corruption.

Protests on

the left, which had called for federal action on behalf of
disadvantaged minorities were losing steam by the time the
1970s arrived.

Levitan and Zickler (29, p. 191) identify

the many different groups with an interest in employment and
and training at that point in times

civil rights organiza-

tions, unions, educational associations and community organizations--clearly not all dyed-in-the-wool conservatives.
Yet,

accordi~.g

to those authors (29, p. 191), "These diverse

organizations tended to oppose encroachment of the federal
bureaucracies into their domains while demanding federal
dollars."

The mood of the •second New Deal" (5, p. 2) was

waning and the mass of federal regulations was stimulating a
"reaction• (3, pp. 104-105) to the "overload" (J, pp. 6-lJ)
in the federal system.

The overload was associated with ex-

cessive federal intervention.

President Nixon's efforts to
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streamline federal bureaucracy implied that the reaction had
"set in" by 1969 (J, pp. 104-105).

Nixon's 1972 landslide

victory in the presidential race against Senator George
McGovern (a proponent of federal social programs) is perhaps
the most impressive indicator of the political climate of
the time.
The climate characterized by the above relationships
between the Administration and various other groups, as well
as by a national mood leaning toward conservatism, held implications for employment and training policys namely, that
the pace of reform was to be affected, and that the quality
of reform was conditioned by that climate.
The pace of reform was inhibited at first by the political climate.

From 1969 until 19?3, the gulf separating

the Democratic Congress (and its pro-categorical constituents) from the Nixon Administration prevented any legislative compromise from being reached.

On the bureaucratic

front, while the Administration made several efforts at
building the capacities of state and local governments for
running programs, the political atmosphere could only work
to retard such efforts.

The wariness with which members of

Congress and liberal interest groups watched the Administration• a shuffling of funds and regulations guaranteed that
bureaucratic~lly-imposed

changes would not get very far.

However, the pace of reform was accelerated quickly
in 1973, when DOL threatened to refurbish the employment
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and training system to its own liking, without seeking Congressional approval.

In the words of the ACIR reports

The attempt to blur, if not eliminate, the lines between categorical programs through administrative
actions proved successful in motivating supporters
and defenders of the manpower status quo in the Congress· to rise to the occasion ( 1, p. 10).
According to Van Horn (J2, p. 64), Congress, anti-poverty
groups, and state and local government officials were alarmed by the Administration's behavior.

Across the political

spectrum, nearly everyone with a stake in employment and
training was roused to action--ready to compromise in order
to work out viable legislation.
The quality of reform was conditioned by the political
climate to a large extent.

Ot course, the basic decentral-

ist thrust was supported by the discontent with federal solutions to problems.

In addition, the political climate en-

sured that categorical targeting upon disadvantaged clients
and anti-poverty organizations (as service providers) would
not receive as much sympathy in reform proposals as it had
in the past.

However, such a climate did stimulate defend-

ers of the 1960s' approach to fight hard for their interests
and try to blunt the edge of the reform movement.

Given the

influence which these people still had on Capitol Hill, this
would have the effect of forcing a significant degree of
compromise on the part of the reformers if a passable bill
were to be produced.

Nevertheless, a new policy orientation

was developing, for employment and training as well as for
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other substantive areas.

David B. Walker summarizes that

orientation a
It was ostensibly anticentralization, anticategorical, and anti-administrative confusion. In positive terms, it supporteda greater decentralization within the federal departments to their field
unitss a devolution of more power and greater discretion to recipient unites a streamlining of the
service delivery system generally1 a definite preferring of general governments and their elected
officials; and some sorting out of some servicing
responsibilities by governmental levels (3, pp.
104-lOS).

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The 1960s was a period of economic growth and escalating federal expenditures.

According to Adam Smith (37, p.

20), the national economy was "running at full capacity" in

1965.

Ginzberg (10, p. 6) reports that it was expanding up

until 1969.

Federal spending on both Vietnam and Great So-

ciety programs was also on the rise.

Under these conditions,

unemployment was not widely perceived as a priority issue,
although inner-city or rural poverty areas exhibited a
structural form of unemployment (i.e., deriving from social
and institutional

characteristics, as opposed to deriving

from cyclical economic fluctuations).

Inflation remained at

a safe 1-2% until mid-decade, but then began to climb as a
consequence of high spending (J?, pp. 20-21).
When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he was faced
with a

5% i:n:flation rate (J?, p. 21); a disturbing develop-

ment at the time.

To slow the rate of inflation, federal
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policy called for a tightening of credit and higher taxes

(37, p. 21).

After 1969, there was a marked propensity

toward recession and rising unemployment, in contrast to the
pattern of the

mid-19~0s

(8, p. 315; 10, p. 6).

This new

wave of unemployment was a consequence of a change in the
direction of the national economy.
nature (8, p. 315).

Thus, it was cyclical in

Discontent arose as social groups, nor-

mally above the poverty line, became recession victims and
exerted pressure on the government for assistance.
In response to an increasingly urgent situation, EEA
was passed in 19711 authorized at $2.25 billion for two
years (8, p. 315).

President Nixon signed the bill (1, p. 9)

in spite of his dislike for public employment.

Thus, the

largest public employment program since the Great Depression
was put into operation (10, p. 60).
However, EEA was still not enough.

It was meant to put

150,000 people to work and was only authorized for a limited
time period (8, p. 315).

Yet, the economy continued to ex-

hibit an unruly combination of inflation and recession
("stagflation") into President Nixon's second term, which
began in January, 1973.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics put

the national jobless rate at

5~

for that year (JJ, p. 486),

and there were many areas of the country where it was higher.
For example, Mayor _Joseph Alioto of San Francisco claimed
that, in certain ghetto neighborhoods, unemployment was between 20-30% {JJ, p. 78).

According to Senator Gaylord
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Nelson

(Democrat-Wi~eonsin),

cities was over

10~

the rate in 1973 for inner

(J8, p. 12079).

Kenneth Young, of the

AFL-CIO, cited 4.2 million unemployed and 7-8 million total
unemployed and underemployed nationwide, at about the same
time (J4, p. 127).

Compounding the problem was the develop-

ing energy crisis.

In the opinion of Congressman Michael J.

Harrington (Democrat-Massachusetts), that crisis served to
increase unemployment even more (39, p. J8426).

Unemploy-

ment had become a major national issue for the first time in
at least a decade.
What did such an economic situation imply for employment and training reform?

The effects of the economic situ-

ation ran along two lineea

effects upon the pace of reform,

and, upon its quality.
The pace of reform was to be accelerated by the increase in unemployment.

Cyclical unemployment, coupled with

persistent inflation, affected citizens and organizations of
many different stripes.

Local governments needed money to

get people in their jurisdictions off the streets and into
training or public service jobs.

Anti-poverty organizations

had to fight for their programs in the midst of greater competition from those recently hit by layoffs, cutbacks and
closures.

Members of Congress could not sit still under the

circumstances.

The rise in unemployment thus served to in-

crease the pressure on Congress to move ahead with some feasible reorganization of employment and training policy.
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The quality of upcoming reform was to be affected significantly by economic conditions.

The essential point, in

this respect, is that cyclical problems preoccupied policymakers and structural concerns took a back seat.

For one

thing, public employment remained as popular as ever, despite
strong conservative sentiment against it.

Thus, the stage

was set for a battle over how far policy should go in ensuring a program like that authorized by EEA.

Additionally,

the method of funding employment and training programs, something already being questioned by critics of the categorical
system, would become a subject of debate.

Unavoidably, fund

disbursement would be simplified through the use of a few
formulae, in which grant monies would be disbursed according
to factors set by legislation, and on a basis of automatic
entitlement.

This would rationalize a system in which

grants were made through many separate channels.

With un-

employment rising, the number of citizens without work in a
given area became an important formula factor {JJ, J4).
Also, given the cyclical nature of that unemployment, conflicts over inclusion of structural poverty indicators in
the formulae were bound to arise.

Generally speaking, re-

form was steered in a distributive (as opposed to redistributive) direction by the economic situation.
became the item of prime concern.

Budget cutbacks

For example, Senators

Claiborne Pell (Democrat-Rhode Island), Edward M. Kennedy
(Democrat-Massachusetts) and Alan Cranston (Democrat-
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California) joined together in July of 1973 to call for special treatment of •areas or States which face unusual unemployment problems because of cutbacks at Government facilities" (40, p. 25713).

Senator Pell specifically mentioned

naval bases in his home state of Rhode Island, which were
falling victim to government belt-tightening policies aimed
against inflation (40, p. 25713).

Such a concern did not

indicate a determination to attack poverty based on social
or economic structure.

Finally, the economic pressure which

accelerated the legislative activity of various groups, combined with political and systemic (i.e., employment and
training system) factors to raise the probability that reform would embody a compromise among the objectives of those
groups.

SUMMARY OP THE CONTEXT OF REFORM
The context of employment and training reform was a
source of three policy-relevant factors which affected the
direction in which federal efforts would move.
tors werea

Those fac-

(a) systemic constraints apparent from both ex-

periences with the programs of the 1960s and pre-CETA reform
attempts, (b) a political climate characterized by conflict
between the Nixon Administration and others (notably Congress) plus a lessened faith in the federal government, and
(c) an economy suffering from "stagflation" and a rising
unemployment rate.
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The employment and training system of the 1960s was
uncoordinated, yet also overly-centralized.

Recognition of

these problems led to thinking about how to improve the system in order to make it more efficient and responsive to
differing geographical conditions.

Ideas for improvement

centered upon the need to consolidate programs, to decentralize authority over them. and to expand the discretion of subnational governments with respect to utilization of grant
funds.
Pre-CETA attempts to apply these ideas yielded several
lessons for policymakers and those who would affect employment and training policy.

Chief among those lessons were1

that prime sponsorships were viable entities, but that they
must possess the authority, scope and technical capacity appropriate to administering programe1 and that state and local
general governments were the main candidates for prime sponsorships.
The political climate held implications for reforms
reform would be accelerated following an initial period of
stalemate1 reform would shift policy toward decentralization
and decategorization.
The condition of the economy, with its rising cyclical
unemployment, affected reform bys

accelerating it1 by en-

suring that public service employment would be a consideration; by raising the question of how grant funds should be
disburseds and by steering employment and training policy
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in a more distributive direction relative to earlier policy.
Finally, the context just described was of such a
nature that moderation of demands on all sides was required
for a bill to be passed.
shadowed.

A compromise package was thus fore-

CHAPTER VI
IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
The policy environment set the stage for reform, but
the basic values and beliefs of those involved played an important role too.

Leaving aside common factors (like faith

in the democratic process) as well as irrelevant factors
(i.e., ideological elements not bearing directly on the reform debate), Chapter VI will focus on the major ideological
controversies shaping the legislative outcome.

Three signif-

icant sets of opposing beliefs were identified as having affected the direction in which employment and training policy
would move in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

They were

manifested in arguments over the desirability ofa

(a) de-

centralization and decategorization, (b) public job-creation,
and (c) redistribution.

DECENTRALIZATION/DECATEGORIZATION
Devolution of power from the federal to subnational
governments was the fundamental point of ideological contention.

Arguments derived from conflicting beliefs about who

was better suited for controlling programs--federal bureaucrats, or persons reporting directly to elected state and
local officials.

A preference for the latter was most
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demonstrably held by the Nixon Administration, many state
and local officials and conservatives in general.

In their

eyes, the proper place of the federal government was in the
setting of broad national policy goals and standards.

With-

in such broad guidelines, subnational governments should design and fund programs to fit the labor market and social
makeup found in their jurisdictions.

A preference for cen-

tralization was held most prominently by organized labor,
representatives of the disadvantaged and liberals in general.
They felt that consistency of service around the country and
I

protection of local minorities

re~uired

standardized under federal control.

a system which was

The centralists bolster-

ed their argument with evidence of the neglect of poor and
nonwhite minorities by state and local governments.
President Nixon himself, reached back to the Founding
Fathers when putting forth the basis of a belief in decentralization and decategorization.

In the process of ex-

plaining the "role of government," he cited the Tenth Constitutional Amendments
'The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people'(41, p. 92).
The President then said1
The philosophy of the Founding Fathers embodied
in this amendment is also my philosophy. I believe that a larger share of our national resourcea must be retained by private citizens and State
and local governments to enable them to meet their
individual and community needs.

I

I
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Our goal must not be bigger government, but better
government--at all levels (41, p. 92).
In presenting the decentralist philosophy to readers,
Mirengoff & Rindler explain why a greater subnational retention of resources is expected to better satisfy local needsa
The ideological underpinning is the belief that a
decentralized system is a better expression of popular will. It was assumed that under [decentralization/decategorization] there would be greater community involvement and that local decisionmakers
would be more closely attuned to the electorate and
to the clients served (31, p. 4).
A few pages later, the same authors pin down the mechanism
through which decentralization and decategorization will
work1

"Placing the manpower program under the aegis of state

and local elected officials puts it in the political arena
and subjects it to the local political process• (Jl, p. 11).
Thus, by entrusting more control and resources to the
subnational political process, decentralization and decategorization were expected to enhance the ability of employment and training programs to reflect the will of the populace in a given place.

By applying this philosophy, pro-

grams which were, in President Nixon's eyes, "'bureaucratic
[andJ remote from the people they mean to serve,'" and whose

"'direction does not belong in Federal hands'" (1, pp. 8-9),
could approach the responsiveness to the electorate so prized
in a democracy.
Such a view found solid support during the period of
employment and training reform.

Governor Patrick J. Lucey,
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of Wisconsin, agreed with it, and his opinion exemplified
the positions of many state and local officialss
In short, we agree with the President that there is
a need for a newly defined federalism in America,
that narrow Federal program requirements frequently
get in the way of good administrative policy and
meaningful and effective action at the state and
local levels ()), p. 51).
William

c.

Woodward, President of the National Alliance of

Business (NAB), expressed the position of members of the
business community, with respect to the above principles•
Existing programs have spread, and grown, and become bureaucratized. In manpower--as in urban renewal, housing and many others--there is simply no
way for a national administration to make the most
effective decisions. They must be made locally
(42, p. 4)4).
The view from the other side of the ideological fence
was quite different.

While praises sung to direct, local

democracy might have been music to some ears, liberals, labor
and disadvantaged minorities heard another sound.
The centralist view applied what might be called "an
emasculative interpretation of the Tenth amendment" (43,
p. 376).

That is, the centralist position was based upon a

very narrow perception of that Amendment's reservation of
powers to state (and, legally, therefore local) governmentsin contradistinction to President Nixon's interpretation.
Centralist ideology was opposed to the President's assertion
that employment and training (as well as other programs) do
"' not belong in Federal hands'" (1, pp. 8-9).

After all,

many of those programs originated in federal hands.

As Chase
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and Ducat state, "The crush of modern day conditions, generated by industrialism and war, have created conditions of
nation-wide ••• interdependence," forcing the federal government toa
••• coordinate attacks on problems lying traditionally within the_purview of the states, but which,
because states Land localities] cannot or will not
eradicate them, have cumulatively assumed national
proportions (4J, pp. 374-375).
From this perspective, a strong central government role was
required or problems, such as racial discrimination, would
never be addressed.
Representatives of disadvantaged minorities were probably centralism's strongest advocates.

Paul J. Smith (33,

pp. 664-665), of the Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona (a native American group), wrote a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy in April of 1973.

In it, Smith expressed anxiety about

the consequences of leavi?¥?: native Americans to the care of
the state of Arizona and its local governments.

He based his

feelings upon negative past experiences with the Arizona government and called for "special
constituents.

legislation~

to protect his

Dr. Leon Sullivan (33, pp. 590-595), head of

Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America (an organization for training the disadvantaged), cited survey data
before Congress in May, 1973.

The data implied that, of 105

Centers nationwide, "80 could be wiped out" if control of
Center funding were transferred to state and local governments.

Dr. Sullivan displayed little confidence that state
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and local officials would be as helpful to his anti-poverty
organization as federal officials had been.

Concurrence in

the need for federal control, in an age of interdependence,
came from the AFL-CIO.

That labor organization felt that

what was needed was a policy to bring "all federally-supported manpower programs under a federal, centrally consolidated administration in the Department of Labor" (34, p.
131).
What did these beliefs, as held by key actors in employment and training, mean with respect to changes in that
policy area during the late 1960s and early 1970s?
Thanks to the strong advocacy of decentralization and
decategorization by the White House, those ideas were bound
to be heavily reflected in any reform legislation.

Any leg-

islative proposals which smacked of a mere repetition of the
established centralized system were liable to suffer a Presidential veto.

The influence of the White House, in this re-

spect, was further enhanced by a loyal Labor Department.
The embrace of decentralist ideology by both state and
local officials and much of the business sector meant that
the Nixon Administration would have powerful allies.

Aside

from the political clout which such an alliance possessed in
a general sense, state and local governments and many private
firms were functionally indispensable to any version of employment and training system which might obtain.
Another implication for employment and training policy,
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evident from the above ideological views, was that elected
officials of state and local governments would be prime candidates for program control responsibilities.

This is be-

cause of the importance placed upon the subnational political
process in decentralist thinking.

For believers in that

process, it seemed the preferred location for deliberation
of the pros and cons of program alternatives.

A corollary

of this logical element was the notion of community participation-- grass-roots input from a plurality of local organizations.

This concept, with its connotation of popular de-

mocracy, was acclaimed during the 1960s and continued to be
praised in decentralist thinking.
Despite the power of belief in a decentralized system,
centralist ideology remained strong among many actors carrying weight in employment and training affairs.

It is clear,

from the literature and records of policy debates, that belief in the federal capacity to satisfy needs was still potent among Congressional Democrats, ethnic minorities, the
poverty community and labor unions (JJ, 34).

Congressional

resistance to all-out decentralization was thus assured.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
The creation of jobs in the public sector, as a remedy
for rising unemployment, was a second focal point of ideological dispute.

The Nixon Administration and conservatives

were opposed to programs for expanding the rolls of public
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service workers.

Such a policy approach has always been ana-

thema to staunch defenders of private enterprise.

Most Con-

gressional Democrats and liberals were in favor of increased
government hiring, because they perceived it as a more tangible prescription for treating unemployment than waiting for
a revived private sector to absorb large numbers of the unemployed.
The reasoning behind the-conservative distaste for public employment was expounded by economist Milton Friedman
(44, p. 59).

Although the following argument was published

shortly after the enactment of CETA, the issue was the same
one as before enactment.

To Friedman, and others opposed to

public employment, the appeal of hiring more people on taxpayers' money was •spurious," because the "indirect" costs
of such programs were likely to outweigh the immediate benefits.

He raised the question of where funds to pay for pub-

lic jobs would come from.

Friedman considered available an-

swers to that question unsatisfactory.

For example, cutting

government spending in one substantive area, to finance new
public employment in another area, was expected to cause layoffs in the first area--plus, as Friedman saw it, "very likely a loss in efficiency."

Another common answer to the above

question was that the newly created positions could be paid
for out of revenues raised from tax increases.

However, such

a solution was frowned upon by Friedman because he felt that
tax increases only hindered the capacity of the private
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sector to hire people.

In that case, "New government em-

ployees would simply replace persons employed in the private
sector.

'Make-work' would replace private employment that

met demands of taxpayers."

Friedman continued, dismissing

the possibilities of funding public employment through "borrowing from the public," or "printing or creating new money."
He envisioned problems with the borrowing option because
"less credit would be available to lend to others."

More

public borrowing would also mean that "Make-work would replace employment devoted to adding to our productive wealth."
Friedman completed his criticism by pointing out that increasing the money supply, to pay for new government jobs,
would be "inflationary and so would undo with the left hand
what the right hand was striving to achieve--namely, less
inflation."

Recall that, early in the first Nixon Admini-

stration, federal policy prescribed a tightening of credit
in order to fight inflation, and this was followed by employee layoffs (37, p. 21; 8, p. 315).

Turning to a pre-

scription of what to do, given such an economic quandary,
Friedman suggested easing up on anti-inflation measures and
"improving our system of welfare and of insurance against
long-term unemployment."
Thomas P. Walsh, of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (J4,
pp. 186-189), expressed a more moderate opinion on public
hiring, yet one which nevertheless revealed a dislike for
such an approach.

He could have accepted a program providing
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temporary jobs, with clients tightly restricted to those unemployed the longest, and on the condition that •these jobs
should avoid competing directly with business for workers."
Walsh asserted the superiority of the private sector in employment and training affairs.

As evidence for this, he

pointed out that four out of five members of the work force
were privately employed.

As further evidence, he cited the

success of the National Alliance of Business/Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (NAB/JOBS) program* in channeling over a million disadvantaged youth into employment.

In

Walsh's estimation, since business was "best informed on the
number and types of current and prospective jobs," neglecting "to take advantage of the experience and perspective [of]
business could result in unrealistic and wasteful manpower
training programs."
Advocates of public employment saw matters in an en- .
tirely different light.

They brought up the Employment Act

of 1946 as proof of federal acceptance of responsibility for
reducing joblessness, and countered the above arguments with
respect to the social and economic viability of public hiring.
Congressman Henry

s.

Reuss (Democrat-Wisconsin) (39,

pp. J8422-J8423) supported public employment as a remedy for
recession-induced layoffs, for four reasons.

First, he re-

*a federal categorical program, begun in 1968, in
which poor clients were trained by businesses (JO, p. 571 45,
p. 114).
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ferred to federal responsibility under the Employment Act.
Secondly, he considered public employment to be the most direct way to put people to work.

Third, Reuss did not believe

that public employment caused inflationary problems.

Rather,

inflation was fed by shortages in the economy, including
shortages of labor.

Finally, the Congressman thought that

public hiring would help to avoid a bigger recession, because
certain economists estimated such hiring would yield more
jobs in the private sector.
to the effect that•

He cited professional opinion

for every public job created, two addi-

tional private ones would result.

Not content with defending

public employment, Reuss attacked the view which called for
policies aimed at macroeconomic expansion--to wait for benefits to (as Reuss saw it) "trickle down."

That approach re-

quired too high a consumption of fuel and raw materials for
the Representative from Wisconsin.
Others agreed with Congressman Reuss.

Kenneth Young,

of the AFL-CIO (34, p. 131), also referred to the Employment
Act, and offered the labor federation's own interpretation
of federal responsibility.
when the

11

According to that interpretation,

regular" workings of the economy failed, federal

responsibility consisted of funding a "large-scale publicservice employment program," because training without jobs
waiting for trainees was nonsensical.

Mayor Patricia

Sheehan, of New Brunswick, New Jersey (33, p. 124), sided
with Congressman Reuss, stating that "many economists"
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believed that public employment was the "least inflationary•
way to expand employment and could help alleviate the "desperate shortage of public goods and services which cities
face.N
The arguments over public employment were based upon
expert analytical estimates--more so than the other ideological disputes generated during reform proceedings.

In try-

ing to convince constituents of the desirability (or undesirability) of public employment, the leading political forces
on either side prepared their evidence carefully.

Between

them, business leaders and the Nixon Administration constituted a potent coalition on this issue.

Opponents of pub-

lic employment argued for the anti-public employment faith
by emphasizing the detrimental consequences they anticipated
from an expansion of government hiring.

They would endeavor

to construct a scenario of increased inflation, taxation,
corruption and waste, as well as lowered productivity--all
coming on top of an already unhealthy economic condition.
On the other hand, labor, state and local governments and
most Congressional Democrats would stress that "stagflation•
could be treated with the assistance of public employment.
They would also point out that, with EEA expiring in 1973,
the chance to extend that assistance should not be passed up.
The public employment programs of EEA had been popular
(JJ, J4, 39, 40).

Unemployed clients who benefited from that

Act greatly appreciated being offered jobs, although temporary
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ones, in public service.

Accordingly, the members of Con-

gress and state and local politicians who presented constituents with such benefits accrued political merits.

Thus,

once EEA was on the scene, and given the condition of the
economy, public employment seemed assured of continuation.
The only questions left, by 1973, were those dealing with the
scope and duration of a new public employment program.
The range of answers to these questions was sizeable.
At one extreme were liberals like Senator Walter Mondale
(Democrat-Minnesota) (33, p. 1)4) who felt that much of the
discourse on public employment was blind to the important
point.

While others argued over fractional changes in fund-

ing, Senator Mondale's opinion was1

"As a matter of fact, I

think we ought to determine whether the program should be
doubled, tripled, or quadrupled."

At the other extreme, were

public employment critics, like Nixon Administration officials, who wanted no part of a mandatory or permanent program.

They wished to leave this kind of program as one of

several options available at the discretion of prime sponsors (JO, p. 55).

In step with the White House, DOL (JO, p.

56) had proposed that only areas suffering unemployment of 8%
or higher should be eligible for public jobs money, when
other such proposals were generally in the range of 6-7% (JJ,

J4, 39. 40).
Employment and training reform would not occur without
a resolution of the public employment question.

Some exten-
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sion of government hiring, similar to EEA, was unavoidable.
That the program would be significant in size. (i.e., approaching EEA) was clear, judging from the condition of the
economy and public employment's political appeal.

Yet, just

how far Congress would go in guaranteeing such a program remained unclear.
REDISTRIBUTION
Ripley & Franklin (9, p. 21) define distributive 1policy
as •aimed at promoting private activities that are said to
be desirable to society as a whole and, at least in theory,
would not or could not be undertaken otherwise."

Elaborat-

ing upon the concept, those authors state that distributive
policies yield "subsidies," which are spread around in such
a manner that "there appear to be only winners and no
losers."

In other words, a sense of competition between

those subsidized is lacking.

Figuratively, they character-

ize distributive policies as those which "embody the federal
pork barrel in its fullest sense.•

In contrast, the same

authors define redistributive policy ass
••• intended to manipulate the allocation of wealth,
property rights, or some other value among social
classes or racial groups in society. The redistributive feature enters because a number of actors
perceive there are 'winners' and 'losers' in policies and that policies transfer some value from one
group at the expense of another group (9, p. 25).
Ripley and Franklin (9, p. 25) then explain that the term
redistributive takes its special political meaning when the
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direction of value reallocation is from the relatively welloff to the relatively disadvantaged.

Such a reallocation of

value usually generates controversy, based upon philosophical differences.
The rationale for redistribution, as put forth by modern American liberals, is based upon a conceptualization of
the role of the federal government as an agency to be used
for alleviating social inequality.

This view has been ex-

pressed consistently by prominent policymakers.

For example,

Supreme Court decisions during the Great Depression (which
served as precedents for later.decades) took this view, enunciating a broad interpretation of federal powers in upholding
the

r~ghts

of workers to organize and of elderly citizens to

enjoy financial security (J, p. 69).

Several decades later,

the same belief was evident in the federal Economic Development Administration (EDA), whose representative in Oakland,
California, Amory Bradford, saw that agency's job program far
ghetto residents as an appropriate method in dealing with
inner-city social problems (7, p. J).
Opponents of redistributive policies have held that
such policies allow too much federal intervention in private
and subnational affairs and foster corruption and administrative red tape as well.

Such a view was expressed during the

1930s, in opposition to policy pronouncements like the Court
decisions just mentioned.

At that time, a reaction to such

redistributive policies took place, in whicha
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Political conservatives in both parties, business
groups, and financiers as well as former president
Hoover, joined in a defense of limited constitutional government, the sovereignty of the states,
and the free-market economy (J, pp. 68-69).
Ripley and Franklin (14, pp. 160-18,), have summarized the
complaints of contemporary critics of federal redistributive
efforts.

To the critics, redistributive programs have been

seen as "'external interventions into local systems,'" based
on "bureaucratic imperatives" and conducive to "fraud and
abuse."

During employment and training reform proceedings,

such convictions (as well as those favorable to redistribution) were in evidence, as the proper emphasis of a new bill
was debated.
Representatives of anti-poverty organizations felt the
political tide turning against them as forces calling for decentralization, decategorization and consolidation gained momentum.

Community-based organizations (CBOs)--national asso-

ciations with local chapters, engaged in redistributive efforts--were worried about losing the government contracts
they had enjoyed under 1960s' legislation.

They perceived

"in the trend toward consolidation a threat to their separate
identity and to the rationale for having separate organizations to deal with specific client groups" (31, pp 112-115).
Republican Senator Jacob Javits (New York) was an outspoken
defender of a redistributive emphasis.

The Senator's posi-

tion was illustrated by a proposal he made to Congress, in
July of 1973 aimed at protecting anti-poverty programs
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established in the 1960s.

Javits wished to retain, for DOL,

the power tos
••• turn a program off ••• [in case] it fails to give
'due consideration to continued funding of programs
of demonstrated effectiveness' for manpower training under the Manpower Development and Training Act
or the Economic Opportunity Act (40, p. 25712).
Those opposed to required tunning of anti-poverty organizations

~referred

to see special consideration for target

groups removed from legislative proposals.

William Kolberg,

Assistant Secretary of Labor, was unequivocal about that.
Kolberg told members of Congress that the Administration's
preference was fora
••• no presumptive deliverers of service, although
we do expect that nearly all [subnational] officials will choose to utilize the services of established and experienced agencies ••• when their
local plans include activities traditionally associated with those agencies (JJ, p. 281).
The Assistant Secretary did not say what might become of established providers, in case local plans did not include activities traditionally associated with those agencies.

Kol-

berg continued with Administration logic (JJ, p. 282) objecting to Senate proposals to mandate services to persons of
limited English-speaking ability and the elderly, saying that
such proposals represented a "step away from the complete decategorization favored by the Administration ...
Walsh, of the

u.s.

Thomas P.

Chamber of Commerce ()4, p. 189), voiced

opposition to a House proposal for guaranteeing that CBOs
and other organizations serving special client groups
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participate in developing prime sponsor plans.
that notion was too categorical.

To Walsh,

He felt that the word

"''target•• in the House proposal• s language was improper.
Walsh preferred reform legislation to "provide an apportunity for participation by a broad spectrum of interests, including business and labor as well as government and minority groups."
Disputes over the method of disbursement of employment
and training funds were particularly relevant to the question of redistribution.

Reformers wanted to simplify the

various funding procedures, of the programs up for consolidation, into just a few formulae.

The new formulae would be

based upon measures of the relative need of recipient jurisdictions (e.g., a state or county's proportion of the total
of unemployed persons), with recipients being automatically
entitled to money by virtue of being prime sponsors.

Prior

to reform, many employment and training progrms had been funded on an individual project basis, while others were formula
funded.

Under project funding, "not all eligible areas need

receive shares, and these shares need not be equal ••• unlike
formula grants, they can be molded to fit the recipients'
peculiar problems .. (47, p. 270).

Project funding also dele-

gates "considerable discretion to middle-level federal grants'
administrators, including the power to decide what units •••
[qualify] in the competition for project awards" (J, p. 103).
The established combination of funding methods led many to ·
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complain of unfairness to certain parts of the country-, and
certain constituencies, which were left out in the cold, not
to mention

the~'Pf'..O.blem

-Ofv.administrati ve complexity.

Yet,

as attractive as reform proposals may have seemed to innocent
observers, proponents of redistribution felt that reformist
plans would pull the rug out from under poverty constituents,
who had been favored by 1960s' arrangements.

Unfortunately

for the latter, reform cries for consolidation, simplification and reduction of federal bureaucratic discretion, were
louder than voices def ending the existing system.

Some ex-

amples of formula disputes will serve to illustrate the relationship between funding options and a redistributive approach.
One of the few differences between the two chambers of
Congress (perhaps the most significant), in writing comprehensive legislation in 1973. was that between the funding
formulae they presented.

The House version called for dis-

tributing money for "c.omprehensive manpower services" (i.e ••
the basic grant to subnationals) on the basis of •the

rela~

tive number of unemployed" in a prime sponsorship or program
area, as well as the "previous year's allotment of manpower
funds" for that area.

The Senate wanted this formula based

on "the relative number of unemployed and of adults with an
annual income below the Bureau of Labor Statistics' lower
living standard budget" (1, p. lJ).
oversimplifying

th~

While this example risks

nature of these proposals, it is clear
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that the Senate version was taking a more redistributive
path.
A little later in the aame year, the House was considering a new basic grant formula which incorporated•

(a) the

relative number of unemplQyed, (b) the relative size of an
area's work force, and (c) the previous year's allotment ()4,
p. lJO).

The AFL-CIO and a segment of city officials felt

that inclusion of the work force factor would result in a
pork-barrel distribution of benefits.

Accordingly, those

actors proposed alternative formulae, incorporating adult poverty in place of work force size (J4, pp. 48-491 J4, p. lJO).
One final example shows the magnitude of the distributive-redistributive question, a question which was often
hidden, but nevertheless present.

The National Association

of Counties (NACO) was pushing for a shift of programs and
funding emphasis toward non-urban areas, complaining that the
1960s' big city approach was ignoring the vast needy population in suburbs and rural places (J,, p. 151).

NACO backed

the House formula just mentioned (with unemployment, work
force and prior year's allotment) (J4, p. 67)--the same one
which labor and some mayors thought would be too distributive.

Apparently, the counties felt they would fare better

under that arrangement.

While not openly criticizing redis-

tribution, MACO was backing a formula which veterans of the
War on Poverty saw as too broad in its spreading of benefits.
It appeared that the 1960s' redistributive approach
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would be altered in favor of a wider distribution of services
and jobs.

Funding revision was in the offing, and no formu-

la proposals called for a predominance of poverty factors
over other factors (e.g., previous funding).

An area's rela-

tive number of unemployed could be an indicator of recession
damage as much as of structural poverty.

While defenders of

categorical targeting tried offering formula proposals which
would stress redistribution, they remained anxious about the
idea of destroying the network of separate project grants.
Ripley & Franklin sum up the reason for that anxiety1
The choices about who gets what at the expense of
whom (the essence of a redistributive program) are
fuzzed over by the use of a formula to allocate
funds and by the stress on local control ••• Given
the absence of a national mandate to emphasize redistributive benefits, and the inexperience and/or
unwillingness of city and county [or state?] governments to engage in redistributive activity, [decentralized, decategorized] programs will get defined
and implemented as distributive programs, and the
conflicts that arise will focus on questions of
jurisdiction and dollar allocations to geographically defined units rather than on who benefits to what
effect in a broader social sense (9, p. 173).
Cate~orical

targeting on the disadvantaged no longer enjoyed

the support it once had, and was being attacked by the Administration, state and local governments and business1 charged
with responsibility for many of the ills of the system.
However, proponents of a redistributive approach were
not political weaklings, and many organizations on that side
of the ideological fence were fighting for their survival.
Groups like the AFL-CIO, or large community-based organizations, maintained significant influence on Capitol Hill and
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in parts of the federal bureaucracy.

These groups were also

of importance to the stable functioning of much of the employment and training system--being experienced program operators.

They had little choice under the circumstances, but to

accept pending changes.

However, given the place of these

actors in the system, and in American society as representatives of large segments of the population, their calls for
some retention of targeting and "'programs of demonstrated
effectiveness•• (40, p. 25712) could not go entirely unheeded in Congress.
SUMMARY OF IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
The three outstanding ideological disputes during reform proceedings occurred overs

(a) decentralization/decat-

egorization, (b) public service employment, and (c) redistribution.
The Nixon Administration, prominent members of the
business community and the bulk of state and local officials
favored decentralization of program control to subnational
governments, as well as elimination of federal restrictions
on fund utilization by subnationals (decategorization).
They based this position upon a belief in the subnational
political process as a better arbiter of differences over
the nature of programs.

In their view, federal officials

were out of touch with regional, state and local conditions,
and were best suited for setting broad national goals, while
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leaving the means of implementing those goals essentially up
to states and localities.
Opposed to such thinking, were those believing in a retention of a strong federal role in program design and implementation.

Some members of Congress, poverty community groups

and many unions took this view--which was derived from observing an interconnection between different areas of the
country and concluding that strong central coordination was
needed.

The often poor track record of states and local gov-

ernments in areas of social policy seemed to verify the necessity of centralization for these groups.
The embrace of decentralization and decategorization
by many in government, at all levels, plus the private sector, meant that significant changes along those lines were
imminent.

Yet, minority groups, many members of Congress

and others were not about to allow the decentralizing trend
to go too far.

Thus, employment and training policy had to

incorporate some new philosophical principles, while trying
to avoid possible chaos in the delivery system due to the
profundity of applying the new principles.
Opponents of public employment cited many undesirable
social and economic consequences which could be expected
from such a program, as a remedy for cyclical unemployment.
Yet, proponents countered with logic of their own, even
clai~ing

that public employment would be healthy for the

economy.

Given the wide support which public employment
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programs of the Emergency Employment Act received, as well
as the state of the economy, such programs seemed assured
of continuation.

However, those looking at public employ-

ment in an essentially negative light were highly influential, and would do their best to keep such a program from
mushrooming into a limitless spending spree at the taxpayer's expense.
The extent to which employment and training policy
should target on the disadvantaged, as so much of it did in
the 1960s, also divided participants in an ideological way.
Many groups favored an implicitly more distributive approach
because of their perception of Great Society categorization
as unfair in terms of geographical disbursement of benefits.
Prevailing discontent with the heavy hand of Washington
assured a rough road for anti-poverty warriors--a distinctly
different circumstance from the experience of the 1960s.

C.HAPTER VII
OBJECTIVES
The ideological factors above were based upon actors'
philosophical persuasions.

In this part, the concrete ob-

jectives of actors, as well as the significance of those
objectives for the development of reform, will be examined.
The organizational format for this part was devised upon
recognition of several distinct groupings of objectives
among those with a stake in federal employment and training
policy.

Some of those groupings include the objectives of

only a single organizational unit or interest group.

Other

groupings include the objectives of several organizational
units because of a close similarity between the ends sought
by those organizations.

The purpose of this part of the

thesis is to round out the analysis of factors affecting reform, by complementing the parts on context and ideology.

NIXON ADMINISTRATION
The essential objective of the Administration in employment and training reform was in trying to make that substantive area a showcase for President Nixon's •special revenue sharing" model of intergovernmental fiscal relationships (41, p. 93).

Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 128) define
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special revenue sharing (SRS) in terms of a closely related
Nixon model called General Revenue Sharing {GRS).

According

to those authors (6, p. 82), GRS was "based on transferring
federal revenue to subnational governments with as few federal guidelines (strings) as possible," and was meant to reduce federal interference in subnational decision-making so
that officials of the latter governments could "decide on
their~

programs."

priorities, goals, and funding levels for specific
The same authors (6, p. 82) consider the ele-

ments of GRS to be "quite a departure from the conditional
categorical grant programs of the 1960s," and think those
elements were "rightfully dubbed a 'New Federalism'." They
define GRS as aa
••• new model in that it is a hybrid of cooperative
f ederalism--the federal government fiscally assisting subnational governments to achieve their own
objectives--and dual federalism--the ideological
jargon of states' rights and local control {6, p.
82).
To Reagan and Sanzonea
••• special revenue sharing would be just like its
'big brother' GRSa a way of transferring funds
from the national to the local [or state] level
without further federal decision making, except
that SRS would specify a broad area within which
the recipient government must use the funds, such
as community development, law enforcement, education,
or manpower training (6, p. 128).
Of utmost importance was the fact that SRS recipients would
not have to apply for federal money--they would be entitled
to a formula amount, based upon demographic and other data-and "there would be no granting-agency approval [of sub-
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national plans] required" (6, p. 128).
Melvin B. Mogulof (46) also wrote on SRS.

According

to Mogulof, the intent of SRS is the consolidation of grants
while leaving a few federal strings attached.

The role of

the federal government in such a relationship would basically be limited to ensuring that broad national goals are
being met and the law is being obeyed.

The gathering and

dissemination of information, the provision of technical assistance to states and localities and research and development would occupy federal bureaucrats--but not decisions regarding subnational program characteristics.

Also, the

matching requirements so typical of categoricals would be
eliminated under SRS.

Those requirements called for a recip-

ient to invest a quantity of its own revenue in certain activities--that quantity being determined as a proportion of
the federal investment in those activities.

SRS was to re-

place matching requirements with "maintenance of effort"
responsibilities for subnationals to meet; whereby the latter would simply be obligated to sustain the same level of
~~~-

funding in a substantive area.

~

~

~~-

In Mogulof's words (46, p.

30), "Total decategorization" of a policy area would be "the
best initial step" in realizing SRS.
President Nixon declared his Administration's objectives for four substantive areas, including employment and
training a
••• I remain convinced that the principle of special
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revenue sharing is essential to continued revitalization of the federal system. I am therefore proposing the creation of special revenue sharing programs in the 1974 budget.
These four programs consist of broad-purpose
grants, which will provide State and local governments with $6.9 billion to use with considerable
discretion in the areas of education, law enforcement and criminal justice, manpower training, and
urban community development. They will replace 70
outmoded, narrower categorical grant programs and
will, in most cases, eliminate matching requirements (41, p. 93).
With respect to the "manpower training" area, the Administration tried to adhere to the SRS model whenever it was
necessary to state a position.

Even in the atmosphere of com-

promise in 1973, DOL continued to fight for the SRS model.
For example, despite the Administration's private sector support, Assistant Secretary Kolberg (33, p. 282) told members
of Congress that •we are opposed to any implication of writing the categorical [National Alliance of Business] JOBS contract program into permanent law.•
quote is categorical.

The key word in this

Such a stance, against any categori-

cal tainting of SRS, was taken by the Administration consistently during legislative hearings in 1973, and the discretion of state and local governments was spoken of as
being as sacrosanct as the notion of presumptive providers
was sinful (33, 34).

Perhaps the most indicative evidence

of the Administration's adherence to the SRS plan was Kolberg's statement (J4, p. 81) to the effect that federal approval of grants should be based upon prime sponsors' own
certifications that their programs meet national require-
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ments.

That opinion was expressed to members of Congress

only a few months before CETA was enacted, and illustrated
the Administration's tenacity, right up until the end of reform proceedings.
The objectives of the Nixon Administration for employment and training were extremely important to the direction
to be taken by reform.

The weight carried by the Administra-

tion and allies, in pushing for decentralization, decategorization and consolidation, has already been discussed in
this paper.

However, aside from those reasons, the SRS

scheme was significant for employment and training reform
for another critical reason.

SRS served as the yardstick

against which the objectives of virtually all other actors
were compared.

While other forces pushed for changes in, or

retnetion of, certain elements of the status quo, only the
Administration proffered a complete plan for systemic reform.

The Administration took the initiative, and others

reacted.

Most of the discourse on employment and training

reform in the early 1970s, regardless of the terms in which
it was expressed, amounted to different degrees of acceptance, rejection, or adjustment of the SRS framework.
STATES
The National Governors' Conference made no pretense at
apologizing for the status quo in employment and training.
State chief executives had felt left out by the programs of
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the 1960s, and were ready, willing and able to obtain a new
piece of the grant-in-aid action.
Essentially agreeing with the Nixon Administration's
reform plans (as long as those plans were carried out upon
le~islative

authorization), the Governors focused upon one

major concern.

That was, that reform should avoid handing

too much authority over to cities and counties, leaving
states to pick up the odd responsibilities lying outside the
spheres of the former.

A largely federal-local connection

was just what the Governors had to prevent, or else employment and training revenue sharing would be, in their view,
unworkable (33, pp. 50-71).
State governments accepted the probability of playing
a sort of clean-up role--acting as stewards for areas within
states which lay outside the jurisdictions of populous cities
and counties ( 33, 34).

These were the so-called "'balance-of-

state" areas (1, p. 14).

However, the Governors were eager

to play a bigger part, namely, that of central coordinator
of federally-financed employment and training activities in
a state.

Governor Francis

w.

Sargent, of Massachusetts (33,

pp. 52-53), thought "the States must be allowed to play the
major role in setting manpower priorities," because giving
too much power to substate officials would be wasteful and
inefficient.

Agreeing with

~argent

was Governor Calvin

L~

Rampton, of Utah (33, pp. 54-55), who saw "'political fragmentation" replacing categorical fragmentation, if local
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governments were not coordinated through a single state plan.
Rampton felt a long-run consequence of excessive local control would be a renewal of calls for federal intervention to
restore order.

Rampton specified the need for state govern-

ments to control the distribution of resources to substate
units, and not just act as a pass-through station, because
control of money was indispensable for elected officials to
be "heard."

The Utah Governor did acknowledge that the lo-

cals were "equally important, if not more important," in
delivering services.
Another concern of the states was the method of disbursement of federal employment and training funds around
the country.

William R. Bechtel, executive director of the

Wisconsin State Manpower Council (33, p. 71), asserted that
one of the thornier problems states had in this policy area
was the unstable, unpredictable fashion in which federal regional offices provided funds.

Bechtel complained that Wis-

consin had recently suffered three different regional administrators for employment and training in a single year.
Each administrator altered the funding pattern, leaving Wisconsin officials unable to plan for the future.

For reasons

like this, state officials looked for a revision of the funding method along the lines of the simplification into a few
formulae mentioned earlier in this paper (33, 34).
The strong desire by state officials to take on new
responsibilities, led to their basic alignment with the
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Nixon Administration, at least in terms of the latter's preferences for restructuring the employment and training system.
That, plus dissatisfaction with existing funding methods,
implied that the reform movement had acquired some very influential members in the form of state officials.
The determination of state officials, combined with
their increasing functional importance, meant that states
would undoubtedly play a larger role in employment and training than in the 1960s.

State governments had developed their

planning and administrative capacities to a significant extent by the early 1970s.

Yet, even before that, much of the

delivery system was dependent upon such entities as public
schools or the federal-state employment service.

Those en-

tities were connected in various ways to state governments
(e.g., through a state education department), and such connections already implied some responsibility (even if indirect) for employment and training, on the part of state governments.

Thus, the popularity of decentralization, the re-

cently acquired state capacity for joining in implementation
and the continuation of that part of the old system {reform
was not to cover the whole system) whereby state officials
were already involved, implied a larger state role for the
future.
CITIES
City governments represented by the National League
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of Cities-u.s. Conference of Mayors (NLC-USCM) agreed with
decentralization, decategorization and consolidation, and,
like the states, appeared eager for a larger share of program responsibility.

Yet, the cities emphasized certain

items which were of special importance to them.

In one re-

spect, namely the mayors' call for autonomy in the designing
and running of programs, cities were declaring themselves to
be in open competition with the states and populous counties.
Mayor Stanley A. Cmich, of Canton, Ohio (JJ, pp. 76-77)
an officer of the NLC-USCM, provided a convincing argument
for what he called a •bottoms-up• approach to implementation.
Cmich felt it was "ill-conceived to think that an effective
system of planning and operations can be developed from the
top down."

In his view, the real diversities found between

cities would be ignored by state (or federal) officials.
Cmich complained about an idea put forth by the Governor of
Ohio, which would have created state planning districts, one
of which would have combined Cleveland, Akron and Canton in
the same district.

That, according to Cmich, was absurd,

given the differences between those cities.

He held that re-

form should authorize formation of "logical planning districts," to be determined by the "individual metropolitan
core cities and other jurisdictions."

That would best be

achieved through_ "direct funding to the cities," in the mayor's opinion.

Mayor Russell Davis, of Jackson, Mississippi,

also with NLC-USCM ()3, pp. 104-107), concurred with Crnich,
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demanding that local elected officials be allowed to "determine prime sponsorship within their jurisdiction," and that
"locally determined programs and priorities would be presumptive."
Such opinions were mainly directed against state impositions.

Yet, many city governments were apparently wor-

ried about being subsumed under county authority as well.
Steve Cappiello, mayor of Hoboken, N. J. (34, pp. 4)-46),
felt there were a number of smaller cities which, if included
under a county or state sponsorship, would remain underserved.
Specifically, Cappiello asked that the Secretary of Labor be
permitted to designate "smaller metropolitan cities" as prime
sponsorships, "when special and severe manpower problems exist in [those cities, and when they have] the demonstrated
capacity to plan and operate manpower programs.•

John Gun-

ther, executive director of the USCM (34, pp. 47-54), agreed
with this.

Cappiello (34, pp. 45-46) also proposed that

smaller cities be enabled to join together in consortia,
which would then act as separate prime sponsorships. Culhane

(JO, p. 58) reports that city officials supported a proposal
requiri~

counties to have a minimum population of 150,000

to be prime sponsors (as opposed to another proposal of
100,000).

·rhe former requirements would have the effect of

reducing the number of county sponsorships.
Two other points, generally emphasized by city officials, were the need for public employment and the need to

93
maintain past levels of funding within local jurisdictions.
The position of most mayors on public employment was exemplified by Mayor Sheehan, of New Brunswick, N.J.

{JJ, p. 124),

who spoke of the •desperate• need cities had for EEA-style
programs.

Joseph Alioto, mayor of San Francisco

{JJ, p. 80),

said that EEA jobs were •at the heart of the city's public
service.•

The majority of city officials whose views were

discovered by this author felt as Alioto and Sheehan did on
public employment.

Likewise, the need for an adequate •hold-

harmless" clause, in any new bill, was widely cited by city
officials

{JJ, J4). Such a clause would be intended to

guaranty continuation of a certain percentage of previous
funding for a given jurisdiction.

John Gunther {J4, p. SO)

told members of Congress that he was concerned about "disruptions• of decade-long patterns of service and wanted a
•percentage 'floor•• (e.g.,
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of the previous year's as-

sistance) mandated, in order to prevent such disruptions.
Undoubtedly, city governments were anxious about the new
policy trend in which the 1960s' urban emphasis seemed to be
losing support.
One issue around which cities did not unite was that
of the basic grant formula for fund disbursement.

In ac-

cordance with their concern over maintenance of previous
funding levels, city officials supported a formula which
would meet that concern (1, p. 14).

Yet, beyond that, unity

among cities on formula factors was lacking.

The Culhane
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( '.30,

~p.

58) article reveals that the mayors' organizations

did not press Congress for a particular formula, because
there was too much of a divergence of interests among cities
to allow them to close ranks behind any of the available proposals.

By way of example, Mayor Richard Hatcher, of Gary,

Indiana ()3, p. 108), felt that the relative number of unemployed in an area should be the "principal factor,• while
John Gunther (34, pp. 47-54) thought only two factors should
be used--the relative number of unemployed, and, the a11ount
of adult poverty.

Gunther dismissed inclusion of the pro-

portion of the total labor force in an area, because it
would allocate funds to "suburban and more affluent jurisdiction at the expense of central cities and counties.where
unemployment and poverty are the greatest.•
The city stance in favor of a highly localietic, highly decentralized system held some mixed implications for employment and training policy.

Calling for a "bottoms-up"

approach meant that, to the extent that legislation reflected
that call, the local political process would be enhanced as
a forum for shaping programs.

Programs might then be expect-

ed to incorporate both 1960s' and new wave qualities, depending upon the particular locality in which they were devel-

oped.

Given the sympathy which localistic values enjoyed at

the time, a •bottoms-up" system would be a realistic possibility.

In cities where anti-poverty organizations already

possessed close ties to city politicians, 1960s' quality

programs could be expected to continue.

9S
On the other hand,

in places where other service providing organizations had
the ear of city hall, programs would more likely take on a
different (less redistributive?) quality.
The preference of city officials for "hold-harm.less•
provisions (whether in, or separate from, the basic grant
formula), if realized in law, would be expected to supplement the above implications.

Where anti-poverty groups were

already established and friendly with city governments, maintenance of past funding levels would surely serve to perpetuate that situation.

On the other hand, in communities with

a different set or political accomodations, a quite different status quo could just as easily be perpetuated by •holdharmless" provisions.
Two other points of signi!icance for reform are evident from the stated objectives of city officials.

First,

the tenacity with which those officials defended city territory--citing the political, administrative and social importance or their governmental units--implied that the policy road leading away from the 1960s' urban focus would surely
be littered with obstacles placed there by city forces. Secondly, city governments constituted one or public employment's most crucial sources of political support.

In coali-

tion with groups, such as labor, city governments would help
to perpetuate that program, and to reap the fiscal, political
and perhaps social benefits associated therewith.

96
COUN'l'IES
~here

was some similarity between the interests of

county governments and those of the cities, both being units
of general local government.

Nevertheless, counties were in

competition for a greater share of responsibility in implementation.

Thus, while county officials concurred with their

local government cousins in city halls on several items, the
former also pushed for reform provisions which would serve
their units only.
Counties agreed with cities on three basic items.
First, both types of government agressively argued for local
power, and secondary roles tor the federal and state governments.

As Ralph Tabor, Director of Federal Affairs !or the

National Association of Counties (NACO) (J3, p. 112) put it,
federal and state authorities should occupy a •fallback
position~

in employment and training.

Not as vociferous as

the cities about minimizing the role of states, counties
nevertheless were skeptical that state governments could be
responsive to community needs (JJ, pp. 1J6-17j).

Secondly,

county officials favored a maintenance of previous funding
to an area through •hold-harmless" provisions, like their
city counterparts (J4, p. 67).

Third, both types of local

government called for continuation of public employment.
John

v.

Klein, also a NACO officer ()J, p. 145), felt that

prime sponsors (which of course should include counties)
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should be given the discretion to spend virtually any portion of their grant allocations on public employment.
Beyond these items, counties took off on their own.
John Klein (33, pp. 136-138) said a need existed for counties to be prime sponsors in many areas where no sizeable
city was present, yet where a sizeable population lived
under county jurisdiction.

Klein dismissed the idea of plac-

ing fairly populous counties, which lacked large cities, under state stewardship.

He felt there was a •paucity of plan-

ning resources inherent in balance of State status.•

Ralph

G. Caso, President of the New York State Association of
Elected County Executives ()4, p. 69), thought reform legislation should allow county prime sponsorships in high population counties, even if they contained a large city.

In

Caso•s opinion, such an allowance would make more effective
coordination possible.

Ralph Tabor (3), p. 172) asked for

incentives to be made available for local government sponsorships in a labor market area to coordinate their activities.
Such a stance, favoring county autonomy, was backed up
with the results of a NACO staff study, presented to Senators
by Klein (33, p. 151).

The data showed that, as of the be-

ginning of the 1970s, most of the nation's poor and unemployed lived outside of urban areas.

Klein cited statist-

ics likes
Of the 25,522,000 estimated poor in the 1970 census data, 8,165,000--32 percent--lived in central
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cities while 17,355,000--68 percent--lived in sub-

urban and nonmetropolitan areas (33, p. 151),

or, as of 1969, 1,251,000 unemployed lived in •core urban
areas• while 2,237,000 lived •outside those areas.•

Yet,

programs inherited from the 1960s were aimed at large cities.
Aside from poor and unemployed persons, the bulk of the nation's jobs were purported by the study to have moved to the
suburbs.

In Klein's words, "27 million labor force partici-

pants lived in the central cities, [while] over 55 million
members of that group were in suburban and rural districts."
These figures seemed to indicate a need to shift the emphasis of policy away from large cities and toward suburbs and
rural areas.
That indication, along with county opinion, such as
Klein's (33, p. 150), that •other units of government have
not demonstrated either their willingness or ability to deal
with local areawide human resources problems,• while •counties have been quietly building this capacity for years,•
formed the basis of county officials' demands for a status
equal to states and cities in the reformed system.
To a good extent, county and city objectives were to
have a similarity of effect upon the direction of reform,
even though the interests of each only partially coincided.
County demands for full-fledged prime sponsorship status, and
local power in general, coupled with city demands for the
same things, meant that the system was more likely to be reshaped according to the decentralist ideal of community level
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decision-making.

This county/city alignment combined to

greatly reduce chances of having a system in which the national or state governments would be the preeminent decisionmakers.

Given that, plus the city/county support for "hold-

harmless," the way in which redistributive questions would
be settled would be even more likely to follow the path ref

erred to above in the section on cities.

In other words,

between the combined influence of cities and counties on reform proceedings, the probability that the redistributive issue would be settled within an individual community's political framework was increased.

Local power, plus maintenance

of past funding to an area, implied that established delivery
organizations with established access to local politicians
would have an edge over competitors.

Additionally, both

kinds of local government favored public employment, which
served to strengthen that program's prospects.

On the other

hand, counties constituted a leading force pulling employment and training policy away from its earlier urban focus.
This position would have the effect of helping to open up
grant opportunities to a greater variety of recipients than
was true under the 1960s' arrangement.

Van Horn (J2, pp.

157-159) felt this would assure a more distributive policy
approach in the 1970s.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Public schools had been involved in much of the train-
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ing effort of pre-reform policy.

Mirengoff and Rindler (Jl,

p. 25) report that MDTA training funds had been distributed
on a pass-through basis to states, which then generally disbursed the money to off ices of the state employment service
or public schools.

According to Dr. Richard Gousha, Super-

intendent of Schools for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a spokesperson for the Council of Great City Schools*, (JJ, pp. J93J94) federal laws had long mandated school involvement in
education of the disadvantaged, vocational training, research
and development and bilingual education.

Since at least the

late 1950s, in Gousha's view, the assistance provided to public schools under those laws had "moved public school systems
into the Federal political arena where we now find ourselves
having to work simply to maintain the commitment we have made
to the communities we serve.•

Given such a history under the

categorical system, it is no surprise that schools were concerned about the possible results of decentralization.
Anxiety over devolution of control to states and cities
was expressed by representatives of the schools.

Dr. Gousha

(JJ, p. 396) did not wish to see states obtain control of
funding, and demanded that money be passed through to local
agencies.

Likewise, Dr. Paul Briggs, Superintendent of

Schools for Cleveland, Ohio (JJ, pp. 40)-405), was doubtful
*an organization of 23 of the nation's largest city
school systems with responsibility for approximately 5 million pupils (JJ, pp. 381-382).
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that city governments would be adequate repositories of employment and training authority.

Briggs also doubted that

programs of importance to school officials could be protected under revenue sharing.

Finally, Briggs {J4, p. 148)

wanted to avoid duplication of effort, which he thought
would occur if training centers were established by prime
sponsors, separate from ones already existing under local
educational agencies.
In order to have their anxieties eliminated, school
officials asked for legislative guarantees that certain existing programs and funding arrangements not be disturbed.
The Reverend George Smith of the San Diego School District
and a spokesperson for the Council of Great City Schools,

{33, p. 393) wanted school boards recognized as separate
government agencies, since they derived authority from the
states {just like city councils).

Such recognition meant,

for Smith, that "conceivably States would pass on a certain
percentage of the manpower programs to the city school
boards."

Smith (JJ, pp. 381-382) demanded continuation of

the Neighborhood Youth Corps (work and training for disadvantaged youngsters), EEA and programs for persons of limited
English-speaking ability.

Smith's position typified that of

most public school officials voicing opinions on reform (33).
They felt that some kind of guaranty of funds passed through
to them, along with an allowance of the discretion appropriate for running programs, would constitute an acceptable

~2

compromise, given the reformist trend.

Dr. Briggs (JJ, p.

405) made no pretense about his leaningsa

• ••• we have been

comfortable with the categorical aspects of the programs in
the past.

We have no objection to them."

The schools' position would tend to help steer reform
away from too radical a transference of power to subnational
general governments, as well as away from too quick an abandonment of redistributive programs.

The demands for guaran-

teed pass-through and for consideration of schools as separate agencies, represented opposition to the ascendance of
states, cities and counties.

The demands for protection of

programs like Neighborhood Youth Corps, with a redistributive orientation, meant that schools constituted a significant force for impeding any wholesale policy shift away from
redistribution.

Given public schools' sizeable and estab-

lished role in the employment and training system, plus the
inevitability of other groups (notably anti-poverty organizations) supporting many of the schools' demands, some conditions on state and local government discretion were unavoidable.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DISADVANTAGED
Organizations representing the poverty community and
disadvantaged minorities felt threatened by the reformist
movement.

The categorical programs that supported their

existence, and the federal presence upon which they relied,
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constituted two major targets of that movement.

Being on

the defensive, these organizations struggled to obtain legislative provisions which would keep some federal strings
unsevered--specifieally, the strings which amounted to lifelines for many of them.

Although some spokespersons for

these groups paid lip-service to the reformist trend, they
were in fact primarily interested in maintaining a great
deal of categorization and centralization.

To the extent

that they perceived decentralization as inevitable, they
wanted to be assured consideration for state and local government funding.
One of the most active organizations of this kind was
Jobs for Progress, Inc.

This non-profit corporation admini-

stered an employment and training program for Spanish-speaking persons, called SER--funded largely through the

u.s.

Departments of Labor and Health Education and Welfare (HEW)

(33. p. 557).

Ricardo Zazueta, National Executive Director

of Jobs for Progress (33, pp. 549-579), spoke for this
interests during reform proceedings.

group~

While voicing support

for reform through legislation and acknowledging the •transition into revenue sharing," Zazueta wished to "maintain
the integrity of the only national vehicle for the Spanishspeaking."

He presented a letter addressed to President

Nixon, during Congressional hearings, which called for an extension of SER's national contract and retention of its existing level of funding through the coming fiscal year1 1974.
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The letter bore the signatures of 97 members of Congress.
Anticipating decentralization, Zazueta wanted his group to
be considered for funding and program eligibility under both

DOL and state and local jurisdictions.
Dr. Leon Sullivan, of OICs of America (33, pp. 590-595),
petitioned for similar provisions under reform.

While Sulli-

van had •no quarrel• with President Nixon's policy objectives, he nevertheless demanded special consideration for
OICs, because of fears that subnational govermaents would
neglect them.

Sullivan wanted quantitative guarantees of

future state and local OIC funding.
Charles Braithwait, speaking for Community Action directors (33, pp. 217-221), also acknowledged the probability
of decentralization, and, like the above spokespersons, asked
for a degree of limitation upon subnational discretion.
Braithwait wanted legislative languages
••• making CAA.a presumed recipients of Community Action funds ••• by requiring local officials to make a
negative finding (against clear standards for effective services to the poor established in federal
policies, and in a public process) if they wish not
to fund CAAa (33, pp. 217-221),
as well as •clear guidelines for the development of replacement vehicles for those Cils not funded by local officials.•
Representatives of the disadvantaged were modifying
their policy positions in the face of generally unfavorable
circumstances, yet they still enjoyed significant support.
Undoubtedly, their popular constituencies remained, despite

105
the eclipse of the 1960s by the cost-conscious 1970s.

In

Congress these groups still had access to some of the most
powerful legislators in both parties.
ivan

For example, Dr. Sull-

(JJ, p. 590) expressed gratitude to Republican Senator

Javits as he thanked Democrat Kennedy, for sympathizing with
OICs.

Thus, representatives of the disadvantaged promised

a tenacious struggle over the outcome of employment and
training reform.
That tenacity meant that, if a comprehensive bill did
,n2!

ade~uately

embody the demands of these groups, they were

sure to try for separate legislation to meet their interests.
In fact, such attempts were in progress in 1973

590).

(JJ, pp. 502,

Passage of any such separate legislation would make

a general reform bill that much less comprehensive, and the
scope of decentralization, decategorization and consolidation that much narrower.
On the other hand, to the extent that the reform bill
did embody the demands of spokespersons for the disadvantaged,
that bill would unavoidably contain attenuations of reformist
principles.

More specifically, the federal government would

have to continue to bear direct responsibility for a sizeable
portion of employment and training delivery.

Also, some cat-

egorical restrictions on fund usage and program design by
state and local governments would nave to be incorporated in
the bill.

106

BUSINESS COMMUNITY
While not averse to federal employment and training
programs, business groups preferred to limit the federal
role to the setting of general goals and the disbursement of
relatively condition-free grants--as SRS called for.

Also,

business groups were on the lookout for a chance to play a
larger implementation role themselves.

In this respect,

they called for a greater voice in planning and program design, as well as for continuation of a friendly federal attitude toward private sector programs, like NAB/JOBS.

Fi-

nally, business persons were cool toward public employment,
because they expected that program to have negative effects
on the free-enterprise economy.
General support for reform, along revenue sharing
lines, was expressed by business leaders during the period of
the early 1970s.

Thomas P. Walsh, speaking for the U.S. Cham-

ber of Commerce (J4, pp. 186-189), urged Congress to go ahead
with a major reduction of federal control over implementation.
A key point, which Walsh made to members of Congress during
hearings, was that DOL should not play a big part in the approval of prime sponsors' plans.

He would have preferred

that prime sponsors certify their compliance with federal
guidelines, "with on-site inspections generally limited to
inquiries of allegations concerning the misuse of funds."
William C. Woodward, of the NAB (42, p. 4)4) also favored
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greater subnational autonomy, and thought the -basic premises• of revenue sharing were "sound.•
Expecting decentralization to occur, business spokespersons wished to continue that community's involvement in
employment and training.

As Woodward put ita

••• for the same reasons that the involvement of
private industry has been a vital part of the success of national manpower programs--business participation will be essential in making good local manpower decisions.
It is the local businessmen who know where the
jobs are--where they will be--and what kind of
training will be most effective--in the schools and
on the job (42, p. 434).
Willard F. Rockwell, Chairman of the Board of North American
Rockwell (42, p. 471), also felt that industry had an important part to play in job-creation and training •. Rockwell
emphasized the need for federal funding of new programs in
that substantive area through which business could participate.

Walsh, of the Chamber of Commerce (J4, p. 188) told

members of Congress that NAB/JOBS was a worthy program.

In

Walsh's view, under revenue sharing, NA.B in cooperation with
the federal government could •continue to perform an important function by designing and merchandising innovative manpower programs among private employers.•
The tendency of business interests to oppose, or to
support a limited version of, public employment, was touched
on earlier in this paper.

Recall Walsh's desire to prevent

new public jobs from competing with private ones.

Walsh was

emphatic about making public employment a program for

~-
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sitional jobs--perhaps up to two years.

He wanted clients

for such a program to be only the neediest, in terms of time
unemployed and other factors1 such as whether there is no
other •full-time adult wage earner in the immediate family.•
Additionally, the Chamber of Commerce spokesperson was
against a funding floor for public employment being installed in authorizing legislation.

In Walsh's view, such a floor

would usurp •the traditional responsibility of Congressional
appropriations committees• {J4, pp. 186-189).
It was true that reform along revenue sharing lines
represented a theoretical threat to certain categorical programs run by private industries.

Yet, on the whole, the

business sector tended to prefer a roll-back of the federal
presence because of expectations of better program results
coming from the subnational political process.

There exist-

ed possibilities for businesses to expand their participation
in program design and operation and to bring expertise to
bear through that process.

By helping the policy transition

to a decentralized, decategorized mode, businesses were contributing to an opening up of the employment and training
system.

Successfully capitalizing on that opening, private

firms might displace many non-profit organizations as well
as other business competitors who had previously enjoyed
regular federal grant contracts.
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ORG.A.?UZED LABOR

Labor leaders were some of the most outspoken supporters of centralization and categorization, as well as of public employment.

Already experienced with federal training

programs from the 1960s (JO, p. 56), many unions were skeptical of the logic of revenue sharing.

While some union lo-

cals have disapproved of government programs in this policy
area--fearing the programs would compete with union training
activities, and adversely affect average wages and working
conditions--federations and national organizations have
showed a greater tendency to support such programs (8, p.

453).

When early reform proposals were made in Congress,

labor leaders criticized the notion of handing program responsibility over to the states (seeing states as unable or
unwilling to do an adequate job) and called for federal jobcreation (5, p. 26, 10, p. 6).

That stance was still in

evidence at the time of CETA's passage.
The AFL-CIO, as umbrella organization for much of
labor, carried union demands for federal action to Capitol
Hill in 1973.
neth Young

(3~.

That organization's legislative expert, Kenpp. 127-131), spoke to members of Congress

in favor of DOL-sponsored programs for special target groups,
a "federalized• Employment Service and a major role for DOL
in approving prime sponsors' grants.

In Young's words•

We oppose ••• the administration's no-strings manpower revenue sharing approach. We believe that
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unemployment is a national problem that requires
overall Federal control of policy, direction, and
standards (33, p. 489).
The need for job-creation by the federal government
was a theme which unions sounded consistently.

According to

Ginzberg (10, p. 6), organized labor unsuccessfully supported
an effort by Democrats to establish a public employment program in 1970.

p. 486).

Unions were also big supporters of EEA (33,

In 1973. labor groups argued for a continuation of

public employment.

Kenneth Young and AFL-CIO economist Dr.

Markley Roberts (JJ, p. 486) pointed out that decentralization and decategorization were
anty delivery of jobs.

~

concepts which would guar-

They claimed (J4, p. 131) that most

training occurs .2,!l-the-job, and therefore public employment
could serve to complete a comprehensive effort by supplementing training activities.

Young and Roberta (JJ, p. 487)

desired creation of a million jobs (a truly wishful request),
but understood that avoidance of a veto would necessitate
scaling down that demand.

Culhane (JO) reveals that Young

spent a lot of time negotiating with federal policymakers to
get a public employment funding floor spelled out in comprehensive authorizing legislation.
While the AFL-CIO wanted retention of· the 1960s approach, and labor's role under that approach, it understood
that changes were on the way.

Accordingly, Young (J4, p. 130)

informed members of Congress of the federation's preference
for a basic grant formula under an SRS-style system.

It
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consisted of three relative measurements for an areaa

(a)

unemployed persons, (b) adults below the poverty line, and
(c) underemployed persons.

The AFL-CIO rejected utilization

of persons in the labor force as a factor, because it would
not provide benefits according to where the greatest need was.
Beside attempting to influence the basic formula, the labor
organization called for assurances that unions would participate in planning and comment and review proceedings (J4, p.
131).
The position of the unions was diametrically opposed to
the reformist movement.

Having access to Capitol Hill, as

well as some established territory in the employment and
training system, unions represented a major force for preventing a clean sweep by revenue sharing advocates.

Union

calls for maintenance of federal influence, for targeting, and
for public employment, in concert with similar demands made
by the poverty community and others, meant that an ideological compromise would be unavoidable in the final analysis.
VOCATIONAL EDUCATORS
Professionals in the field of vocational education had
a tradition of their own and a unique place in the employment
and training system, which they sought to protect.

While vo-

cational agencies had, in conjunction with the U.S. Training
and Employment Service, •played the leading role in providing skill training" up until 1973 (Jl, p. 89), their training
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curriculum was characterized as outdated and unresponsive to
public needs (5, p. 4).

In addition, the role of vocational

agencies in the training ot target groups under MDTA (22)
meant those agencies were associated with the old categorical system.

Thus, vocational educators were forced to fight

a defensive battle during reform proceedings, and expressed
concerns about leaving too much responsibility to subnational
general governments.
The crux of the matter, for vocational officials, was
to prevent any newly proposed agencies (whether general government prime sponsors or appendages thereof) from usurping
powers held by established public education and training
units.

Lowell A. Burkett, Executive Director of the Ameri-

can Vocational Association (AVA) (J), pp. 607-616), called
for "a definitive and responsible statutory role for state
and local public education and training agencies in the planning and administration of education and training programs."
More specifically, Burkett wanteda
••• the public vocational ••• agency [to] be given an
equal role with the prime sponsors for the planning and administration of the education and training com~onent of any manpower legislation (JJ, pp.

607-616).

He also made sure to voice opposition to notions of allowing
proposed advisory councils (to be attached to prime sponsors)
into the "operation and administration" responsibilities of
existing state and local agencies.

c.

M. Lawrence, Presi-

dent of AVA (34, pp. 140-142) agreed with Burkett, indicating
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concern over the unpredictability of programs under revenue
sharing.

Lawrence wanted vocational education assistance,

which might be forthcoming under reform, to be distributed
•in the jurisdiction of the State board for vocational education.•

Lawrence felt there had been a tendency among sub-

national general governments to neglect vocational training
centers.
Aside from fighting to defend their administrative
territory within a given state, vocational officials wanted
to retain the federal influence of the 1960s as regarded target programs for the disadvantaged.

Having become heavily

involved with such programs, they had a natural interest in
seeing the programs continued.

Burkett (33, pp. 607-616)

specified Neighborhood Youth Corps, training of persons with
limited English-speaking skills, offender rehabilitation,
and supportive services for veterans, as examples.

He saw

a need for •a continuity of involvement of the appropriate
federal human resources agency• on educational policy, and
called for DOL and HEW to be involved in approval of expenditures.

In this way, vocational officials added support to

the combination of forces struggling for maintenance of centralization and categorization.
What vocational educators wanted, by demanding a role
on the same level with prime sponsors in training affairs,
was to preserve a certain institutional framework, of which
they were an integral part.

If a reform bill were to provide
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for that equal status, that bill would represent such a
dilution of reformist ideals as to constitute a defeat for
true believers in those ideals.

In other words, by allow-

ing vocational agencies, or any other agency, equal footing
with elected general governments, the objectives of consolidation and deference to the subnational political process
would not be fully realized.

If the bill did not incorpor-

ate vocational educators in an equal fashion with general
governments, it nevertheless was likely to address the demands of the former.

Vocational schools were fixtures in

America's training system, and, regardless of charges of outdated curricula, were expected to continue as such.

Reform

was not to be so broad in scope as to threaten elimination of
vocational education's legislative and financial base.

Thus,

with the new system of prime sponsors coming into place
alongside the older institutional framework, it seemed that
connections between the two structural forms would be bilaterally beneficial.

Prime sponsors could utilize voca-

tional education's facilities and personnel, and vocational
educators could obtain funding and clients from prime sponsors.

The difference from the past would lie in the revoca-

tion of presumptive provider status from vocational agencies
in certain programs.
U.S. TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
The

u.s.

Training and Employment Service was an old·
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line bureaucracy, which was established in 1933 (4, p. 11}.
According to Mirengoff and Rindler (Jl, p. 10,), it was •the
repository of experience in most aspects of manpower activities," and had played a major part in implementing the categorical programs of the 1960s.

Thus, any discussion of em-

ployment and training reform would have to include consideration of Training and Employment Service objectives.
When Congress began hearings on reform in 1969-70, the
Service was coming under attack from liberals for being unresponsive to disadvantaged minorities (S, pp. 26-28).

That

criticism, and the implications of decentralization, decategorization and consolidation, spelled a possible threat to
the Service's preeminent position in the delivery system.
Van Horn (32, P. 65) reports that the Service did wish to
maintain its established role.

However, no official opinion

was forthcoming at the hearings from the Interstate Conference of Employment Security .Agencies (!CESA), which represented the Service's branches nationwide (5, p. 28).
By 1973, when it appeared that revenue sharing ideas
were going to be realized in legislation, the Service had
developed an official position--one designed to protect its
own interests and go with the flow at the same time.

That

year (33, p. 649) !CESA stood in favor of decentralization
and decategorization, but insisted upon a strong role for
state governments in planning and administration.

Local gov-

ernments, according to !CESA, lacked sufficient knowledge in

116
employment and training affairs, and therefore should not be
entrusted with primary responsibility for implementation.
Perhaps it was natural to call for a state emphasis, since
bureaucratic ties already existed between Service off ices and
state governments.

Tnough federally-chartered and funded,

the Service consisted of "50 semi-autonomous agencies" {31,
p. 103) which were state-run (5, p.J).

Locally-generated pro-

grams might have led to too much disruption of the Service's
place in the delivery system.

A demand for greater state influence in implementation,
coming from "the repository of experience• in this policy
area {31, p. 103), represented pressure against extreme decentralization.

It also represented the acceptance, by an old

bureaucracy, of a more openly political approach to implementation decisions.
SUMMARY OF ACTORS' OBJECTIVES
The Nixon Administration wanted to apply the special
revenue sharing (SRS) concept to employment and training.
SRS would enable the transfer of federal funds to states and
localities with a minimum of strings attached.

Recipient

governments would be automatically entitled to a share of
money (determined by national formula), which would have to
be spent in a certain broadly-defined substantive area.
Mogulof's (46) assessment of SRS charges the federal government with responsibility for general goals while subnationals
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determine specific means.

The Administration adhered closely

to SRS when it stated its position in reform deliberations
and consistently set the tone of those deliberations.
State governments were eager proponents of decentralization, and sought to preempt local governments in the contest for new responsibilities.

Governors felt they could co-

ordinate services within states--something local units could
not possibly accomplish, in the Governors' view.

State offi-

cials also called for a simplification of grant disbursement
methods through use of standard formulae.

The high motiva-

tion and increasing capabilities of state officials meant
that a greater state role in employment and training was on
the immediate horizon.
Cities also favored decentralist, consolidationist reform, but made special demands for a "bottoms-up• approach
to program design and implementation.

Cities wanted to be

treated as prime sponsors, receiving federal funds directly.
Two other city demands, related to the need to keep federal
money flowing to urban areas, were for "hold-harmless• provisions and public employment.

To the extent that reform

would encompass a localistic approach and •hold-harmless•
provisions, programs could be expected to reflect existing
political arrangements in a community.

Furthermore, the

city position served to improve the outlook for continuation
of both the 1960s' urban emphasis and an EEA-style jobs program.
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County officials agreed with cities on three pointsa
(a) programs should be largely the product of local design,
(b) "hold-harmless" was necessary to prevent disruptions in
the system, and (c) public employment was indispensable.
Yet, counties also wanted prime sponsorship status and to
effect a shift in policy focus from urban to non-urban areas.
The coincidence of county and city objectives meant that the
prospect for decentralization was enhanced and that established program providers in a given community would have an
edge over competitors.

Also, the probability of an extension

of public employment was increased by that coincidence.

Yet,

counties were a force contributing to an opening up of grant
opportunities to jurisdictions and organizations hitherto
uninvolved.

If they had their way, employment and training

programs might become as common in suburban and rural locations as they had been in cities--and those programs might
have an impact which would be more distributive than redistributive.
Public school systems held still another view of reform
proposals.

They wanted to maintain federal guarantees that

money would be passed through to them and were pessimistic
about turning over funding and program authority to state and
local general governments.

School officials wanted recogni-

tion as independent grant recipients and/or requirements
which would assure continuation of certain categorical programs in which they had an interest.

They constituted a
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force favoring both a categorical and a redistributive approach, as well as opposing the aacendance of general subnational governments.
Representatives of socially disadvantaged groups
struggled to maintain enough federal control over programs
to enable continuation of the special target approach of the

1960s.

They wanted legislative provisions which would either

extend federal contracts with organizations serving the poor
and neglected minorities, or guarantees of benefits under a

decentralized system.

The fact that these forces possessed

both access to influential policymakers and sizeable constituencies, meant that some targeting of the disadvantaged
for special consideration would be likely.

Thus, to some ex-

tent, decentralization and decategorization were liable to
occur in a moderated form.
Business associations backed the Nixon Administration
to a large extent1 by voicing support of revenue sharing and
skepticism on the value of public employment.

They also

wanted to affect subnational programs and have the federal
government look favorably upon private sector efforts in employment and training.

While some categoricals in which

private firms had an interest might suffer, the business community saw a chance to roll-back the overall federal presence
and affect programs through the subnational political process
under reform.
Labor groups were proponents of public jobs, as well as
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a centralized employment and training system.

Claiming that

most training occurs on-the-job, and that government hiring
could supplement training programs, labor groups demanded a
large-scale public employment effort.

They were basically

skeptical about decentralization and stressed the need for
nationwide consistency of service and targeting of needy segments of the population.

Acknowledging the probability of

grant reform, unions voiced a preference for a basic funding
formula which they felt would serve those needy segments.
Finally, unions wanted a national policy statement to include
guarantees of organized labor's participation in planning and
program reviews.

Effectively in alliance with educators and

poverty/disadvantaged constituencies, these unions acted as a
major force which might thwart the most radical tendencies
of the reform movement.
Vocational educators were primarily concerned with preventing the fosteri13g of agencies which might compete with
vocational schools in delivering training services.

Partic-

ularly, they wanted statutory provisions guarding against a
usurpation of their territory by general government prime
sponsors, or newly-created appendages thereof.

Additionally,

vocational educators wished to protect categorical programs
in which they had become heavily involved over the years.
Their demand for federal authority over spending fit with demands for continued categorization, belying a viewpoint which
was less than sympathetic toward the ideology of decentrali-
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zation and decategorization.
The

u.s.

Training and Employment Service, like voca-

tional schools, represented an entrenched set of interests
facing a possible loss of presumptive provider status.

The

Service came up with an official policy position which was
designed to enable it to adapt to change, but retain as much
of its territory as possible.

That position called essen-

tially for an emphasis on the role of state governments in
planning and administration, and downplayed the ability of
local units to bear program responsibilities.

It appeared

natural for the Service to stress the need for state control
because the Service already possessed important bureaucratic
ties to that level of government.

While such a stance repre-

sented an effort to modify the swing toward wholesale decentralization, it also represented an acceptance of change in
the direction of greater politicization of implementation
decisions.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
CETA of 197) reflected a blend of the above contributory factors, with some factors having a greater effect
than others upon the nature of the legislation.
Decentralization and decategorization of much of the
employment and training system were accomplished under
CETA's first two Titles; Title I covering •comprehensive
Manpower Services• ( 11, p. 42206), and Title I_I for •Public
Employment Programs• (11, p. 42209).

Henceforth, prime

sponsorships of state and local general governments would
design and implement many programs with an unprecedented
minimum of federal interference.

Most importantly, prime

sponsors were given the authority to determine the actual
mix of program activities, as well as funding priorities
for those activities, within their jurisdictions (11, pp.

42206-42211).

As long as sponsors adhered to the fairly

loose federal guidelines for these Titles (11, pp. 4220642211), they would be relatively free, compared to a categorical arrangement (matching requirements, which might divert subnational resources toward nationally-imposed goals,
were conspicuously absent).

State and loca1 discretion was

also enhanced in the Act's allowance for sponsors to freely
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transfer funds. received under either Title I or II. between
most activities allowed under the Act.

Whether or not a

sponsorship qualified for Title II money (i.e •• contained a
high unemployment area) it could choose to spend its allotment on public employment, targeting of poverty populations
or numerous other activities, in any combination it wished

(11, pp. 42206-42211).
Further decentralization and decategorization occurred
through a provision limiting the proportion of Clrl'A appropriations which could go for Title III and IV (federallyadministered) programs, to 2°" of the CETA appropriation for
a fiscal year (excluding anything over $250 million appropriated for Title II in figuring the base amount for this
percentage) (11, p. 42206).

This meant that the vast bulk

of CETA funds would be subject to subnational discretion.
Also, provisions for a cross-section of social groups at
state and local level to have an advisory input on program
plannil"lg and evaluation was made (11, pp. 42207-42208) in
order to enhance community participation.
The impact of several of the contributory factors discussed in this paper can be seen in those characteristics of
the Act which accomplished decentralization and decategorization.

Pre-CETA reform attempts pointed to the need for

administrative entities with sufficient authority and scope
of jurisdiction to implement the new system.

That. plus the

development of experience and expertise by subnational
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government officials during those reform attempts, contributed to the division of responsibilities in the Act whereby
state and local governments were charged with prime sponsorship.

Another systemic factor which led to this feature of

CETA was the set of recognized errors in the 1960s' arrangement (which was lacking in responsiveness to local conditions).

Added to these factors werea

ideological emphasis

upon the subnational political process as the preferred arena
for setting program priorities, pressures exerted by the
Nixon Administration, state and local governments and business groups, and discontent with federal domination (evident
in the early 1970s' political climate), all of which served
to ensure CETA's accomplishment of decentralization and deeategorization.
Despite the historic devolution of power from federal
to state and local governments which the reform of 1973
achieved, some centralization and categorization were maintained by CETA.

The most prominent legislative features in

this respect werea

the Title authorizing DOL to administer

programs directly for •special Target Groups• (Title III)
(11, p. 42211) and the Title authorizing continuation of the
Job Corps under :federal supervision ('l'itle IV) (11, p. 42213).
Title III mandated that the Secretary of Labor •provide additional manpower services• toa
••• segments of the population that are in particular need of such services, including youth, offenders, persons of limited English-speaking ability,
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older workers, and other persons which the Secretary determines have particular disadvantages
in the labor market (11, p. 42211).
Included in this Title were specifics on programs for those
with a language disadvantage, offenders, native Americans,
migrant and seasonal farmworkers and youth (11, pp. 4221142212).

The Job Corps Title provided for continuation of

that training and work experience program for #low-income
disadvantaged young men and women,• prescribed •standards
and procedures for selecting individuals as enrollees" and
delineated "various other powers, duties, and responsibilities• for administration of the Corps (11, p. 42213).

Titles

III and IV were for federally-controlled, categorical programs, and it was the Secretary of Labor (to some extent in
consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) who was to possess authority over the programs thereof--that is, the power of final decision on the specifics of
activities engaged in, clients served, provider organizations and fund allocations (11, pp. 42211-42217).
In addition to the above two Titles, some federal influence was maintained in the implementation of Titles I and
II by prime sponsors, as well as in the form of percentages
of appropriations to be disposed of at the discretion of the
Secretary of Labor.

Federal guidelines to be met in prime

sponsors' plans (to receive DOL approval) were not so strict
as to be called categorical in nature, yet furnished some
limitations upon the freedom of subnational governments.
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For example, to receive Title I funds, state and local plans
had to provide for use of MOTA-established skills centers
•to the extent feasible• if institutional training was to be
a program activity.
lines includeda

Other examples of such federal guide-

requirements that state sponsorships •pro-

vide for the cooperation and participation of all State
agencies• offering employment and training services, certain
priorities to be met in carrying out public employment (such
as giving special consideration to veterans or persons unemployed the longest), and that sponsors' plans assure •to the
maximum extent feasible• that services and opportunities will
go to •those most in need of them• (mentioning low-income
clients and those of limited English-speaking ability) or
that "the need for continued funding of programs of demonstrated effectiveness is taken into account• in serving the
needy.

The Secretary of Labor was authorized to designate

prime sponsors, outside the basic designation, under special
circumstances, could revoke or reallocate grant money upon
'

determination of sponsor malfeasance, and was charged with
the disbursement of

6% of Title I appropriations as well as

20% of Title II appropriations at Secretarial discretion
(but taking into account the needs for holding harmless,
-programs of demonstrated effectiveness• and •the severity
of unemployment• in assisting particular areas {11, pp.
42206-42211).
Schools, unions, anti-poverty organizations and ideo-
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logical liberals did not go away from the formulation process without obtaining some provision for the national effort
they desired.

Yet, in comparison with the categorical pro-

grams replaced by CETA, Titles III and IV appeared to be more
the result of a salvage operation than somethi11g to celebrate, for these groups.

After all, those Titles had limits

placed on them in terms of the portion of CETA appropriations which could be spent on them and did not authorize as
extensive a federal role as the centralists would have preferred.

The federal guidelines for Title I and II plans

also represented a minor success at beet for centralization
and categorization.

Phrases like •to the maximum extent

feasible,• and •programs of demonstrated effectiveness• (11,
p. 42207), could be interpreted and qualified in numerous
ways.

The guidelines posed little threat to the freedom of

prime sponsors to determine the actual makeup of programs.
Finally, the monies earmarked for disbursement at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor (under Titles I and II)
amounted to minor fractions of the quantities subject to the
discretion of state and local governments.
The employment and training system was simplified by
CETA's provisions for reducing the number of federal contracts, consolidating local activities, instituting formulafunding and otherwise reducing duplication of effort and lack
of coordination.

Seventeen national categorical programs ()2,

p. 6), which had generated about 10,000 separate contracts
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between DOL and providers (40, p. 25702), were combined under
a single Act yielding grants to 500 prime sponsors (JO, p.
51) plus some native American tribes and some other special
jurisdictions (11. pp. 42206, 42209).

Further consolidation

was accomplished by replacing uncoordinated competition
among local providers with unified efforts under the umbrella of a single plan in each prime sponsorship.

Instead of

separate deliberations over the funding of thousands of different projects, with attendant perturbations in the flow of
dollars, CETA presented two simple formulae for the automatic distribution of funds.

Recipients under Title I weuld

have allocations determined according to existing levels of
previous funding, and their populations of unemployed and
adults in •1ow-income- families (earning $7 1 000 in 1969
terms, adjusted for inflation thereafter) (11, P• 42207).
Title II recipients would obtain automatic funding according
to the size of their unemployed populations (11, p. 42209).
Several other provisions in the Act were incorporated to ensure a more efficient system.

For example, consortia ot

subnational governments could constitute a prime sponsorship
under !itle I, defined as •any combination of units of general government which includes any unit of general local government qualifying [as a regular prime sponsor with 100,000
or more population]"(ll, p. 42206).

Up to five percent of

Title I appropriations were earmarked for use by the Secretary of Labor -to encourage• formation of these consortia
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(11, p. 42207).
gram agents.•

Under Title II, provision was made for •proThese would be local governments with between

50,000 and 100,000 population, having high unemployment areas,
and falling under a prime sponsor's jurisdiction.

Program

agents would be charged with •funding, overseeing, and monitoringp public employment programs consistent with the prime
sponsor's application for a Title II grant (11, p. 42209).
Various other components of the Act also aimed at eliminating
duplication of effort.

Title I state sponsorships were

charged with the •coordination of all manpower plans in a
State so as to eliminate conflict, duplication, and overlapping between manpower services• (11, p. 42208).

References

to the effect that intormation should be shared and existing
facilities should be utilized are sprinkled throughout the
Act, although they are not all in the form of legislative commands (11, pp. 42206-42219).
While such features of CETA could be traced back to
consolidation ideas, which were praised in many quarters, two
sources stand out.

One was the set of lessons learned from

assessments of the pre-CETA delivery system and the early reform attempts (i.e., systemic factors).

The other major

source for these provisions lay in the Nixon Administration's
concept of revenue sharing.

Recognition of problems with the

system of the 1960s led to widespread calls for simplifying
administrative channels, reducing interagency competition and
combining service efforts at the local level.

Experiences
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with CEP, CAMPS and CMP pointed out the possibilities and
pitfalls of coordinating the energies of those participating
in implementation.

The Administration's revenue sharing

proposals set the conceptual boundaries for reform debates
by

insisting upon formula-funding and consolidation of the

many existing categoricals into •broad-purpose grants• (41,
p. 93).

These ideas were picked up on and carried along by

an increasing number of influential actors, such as business
associations and state officials, and were quite successfully realized in the Act of 197).
CETA's provision !or public employment warrants separate consideration.

This feature of the Act stood out from

other aspects of the bill.

One way in which it was differ-

ent was in its substance.

Public employment is conceptually

distinct from the other training and supportive services usually found in employment and training legislation.

This is

because it offers direct-hiring of clients--and in the public sector--as opposed to efforts at training and inducing
private employers to take on new personnel.

Additionally,

CETA's incorporation of public employment was special in
that there was no mandate that such a program be carried out
at all.

While Title II authorized disbursement of funds to

high unemployment areas and prescribed loose guidelines for
operating public employment, it also contained a section
which reada
Funds available under this title to an eligible
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applicant [i.e. , sponsor] may, at its option, be
utilized for residents of the areas of substantial unemployment designated under this title for
programs authorized under title I and ••• [the special target programs] of title III of this Act
(11, p. 42211).
Thus, it would be legal for sponsorships with high unemployment to receive Title II money and not spend it on public
hiring, as long as it was for the benefit of residents of the
high unemployment area.
The origins of CETA's public employment authorization
were also unique, compared with the rest of the bill.

This

portion of CETA could just as easily have been saved for a
separate piece of legislation, since it was not part of the
reformist repertoire of decentralization, decategorization
and consolidation.

Strong calls for public employment came

equally from advocates and opponents of the reformist-revenue sharing idea.

State and local governments, which were

clearly in favor of revenue sharing, were as adamant in demandi?!g public employment as were labor unions (which criticized revenue sharing).

The ideological debate over public

employment focused upon the question of whether the public
or private sector was best suited for creating jobs.

On the

other hand, the debate over revenue sharing focused not upon
the question of public versus private sector, but upon the
relative roles of national and subnational governments.
Lastly, it was the recessionary economy, and not considerations of either responsiveness or efficiency, which provided

1J2
the major impetus for inclusion of a public jobs program in
CETA.
On the face of it, CETA's public employment provision
(11, pp. 42209-42211) would not appear to represent a victory for advocates of such a program, since this activity
was not required.

Also, forces less than sympathetic to

public hiring managed to squeeze some concessions out of Congress in the form of restrictions on carrying on this activity where it might harm the private labor market or lead to
corruption or abuse.

For example, public employment pro-

grams were prohibited from fostering substitution of federal
money for state or local government revenues in employing
people (11, p. 42210).

Some phrases were also included which

could be viewed as potentially protective of non-government
enterprises and organizations.

For instance, public employ-

ment programs were forbidden to "result in the displacement
of currently employed workers• or to •impair existing contracts• (11, p. 42211).

Such restrictions can be traced

back to the complaints, such as those of business groups,
concerning problems tney expected from

~overnment

job-

creation.
However, looking at this feature of CETA from a broader perspective, it appears that it did represent a victory
for public employment advocates.

The primary consideration

in this respect was that it was common knowledge that simply
allowing such an activity would result in its widespread
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implementation by state and local governments.

This was due

to the political popularity of dispensing jobs to the unemployed.

Beside that, the bill's Title II funding floor of

$250 million for fiscal year 1974 and $350 million for fiscal year 1975, plus authorization of "such sums as may be
necessary• for the fiscal years ending in 1974, 1975, 1976
and

1977 (11, p. 42206) represented a refutation of the ide-

ology of prohibiting or strictly limiting public employment.
This characteristic of the Act was enhanced further by its
allowance for sponsors (who may not be eligible under Title
II) to spend as much of their basic grant as they chose on
public employment (11, pp. 42206-42209).

Finally, the Act

defined public employment jobs as •transitional• yet placed
no definite time limit upon their duration (11, pp. 4220942211).
Another major question resolved with the passage of
CETA was that of the desirability of mandated redistribution.

Basically, the outcome of reform proceedings was un-

favorable to those calling for maintenance of federally-imposed, structural anti-poverty programs of the 1960s' type.
This outcome was related both to the prevailing political and
economic atmosphere of the early 1970s and to the relative
strengths of groups involved in the formulation of the Act.
Economic conditions ensured that CETA would be based at least
as much upon counter-cyclical considerations as upon counterstructural ones.

The political climate, antagonistic to
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federal hegemony, made for difficulties in obligating states
and localities to address redistributive issues.

In addition,

the Nixon Administration, business groups and state and local officials, desiring an opening up of the system and a
wider distribution of benefits, overpowered groups (e.g.,

CAAs} pushing for mandated redistribution.
Titles III and IV represented the Act's incorporation
of redistributive thinking.

As mentioned above, the express-

ed purpose of those parts of the bill was to assist persona
with labor market disadvantages, and between them, those
Titles were relatively specific as to their intended clientele and the kind of programs to be implemented {11, pp.
42211-42217).

Requirements placed upon DOL under Titles III

and IV left little room for the possible conversion of those
programs into channels for distributive subsidies.

For ex-

ample, under Title III, DOL was obligated to assist persons
of limited English-speaking abilities by •the teaching of occupational skills in the primary language of such persons for
occupations which do not require a high proficiency in English• (11, p. 42211).

Title IV specified that a client must

be1
••• a low-income individual or member of a lowincome family, who requires additional education,
training, or intensive counseling and related assistance in order to serve and hold meaningful employment, participate successfully in regular schoolwork, qualify for other training pro«rams suitable
to his needs, or satisfy Armed FOrces requirements •••
(11, p. 42213).
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Thus, to an extent, the ideology of redistribution and objectives of representatives of the disadvantaged, public
school officials and vocational educators, were realized.
The rest of the Act did not assure preferential treatment for the disadvantaged.

Outside Titles III and IV, the

Act contained few provisions of a kind appropriate to redistribution or an amelioration of structural poverty.
significant of such provisions includeda

The most

the vague admoni-

tion to serve disadvantaged and low-income clients •to the
maximum extent feasible," the equally vague requirement to
take "into account" the necessity "for continued funding of
programs of demonstrated effectiveness," the disbursement of
12.5% of.Title I grant funds according to "the relative number of adults in families with an annual income below the
low-income level" in an area, and the required •participation" by CBOs in planning (11, p. 42207).

Considering that

Titles III and IV got the short end of the stick, in terms
of the allocation of appropriations, the essentially distributive character of the Act is apparent.
A final important characteristic of CETA, as enacted,
was its compromise nature.

This was basically due to the

context in which it arose.

The heterogeneous composition of

the employment and training system, as passed down from the
1960s, virtually prohibited anything but a compromise version of reform.

With organizations as dissimilar as the

National Alliance of Business and Jobs for Progress, Inc.,
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comprising that system, change would have to be moderate if
systemic chaos were to be avoided.

Pre-CETA reform attempts

constituted a second set of contextual factors which led toward compromise.

The one-sidedness of early legislative pro-

posals, as well as of DOL's executive action, made these reform attempts vulnerable to criticism and thus prone to
failure.

The executive action could also be viewed as part

of the political climate, in which serious antagonisms existed between the Administration and many groups, and in which
defenders of categoricals perceived a threat to their interests.

That climate pushed reform in the direction of com-

promise, both by increasing the general level of legislative
activity by groups with a variety of objectives and by stimulating def enders of

cate~oricals

to fight for an attenuation

of the more radical tendencies of the reform movement.

Last-

ly, the economic situation increased the pressure on everyone to quit wasting time, get a bill passed, and see to it
that interests were protected in circumstances of evergreater financial undertainty.
It would not be too far from the truth to say that
CETA was a package with something for everybody, though more
for some than others.

A look at the extent to which differ-

ent objectives were realized in CETA will illustrate this.
CETA went a long way toward accomplishing the objectives of the Nixon Administration, though it contained major
provisions which the Administration tried to prevent.

With
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its transfer of power from federal to subnational governments, its initiation of •broad-purpose• (41, p. 93), formula-funded grants and its rejection of matching requirements,
the Act formalized much of the SRS model.

Yet, the provi-

sions mandating DOL target programs and residual powers to
be held by the Secretary of Labor were not in accord with SRS.
Also, the authorization of public employment took place in
spite of Administration pressure to block it.
State governments' objectives were not attained as
fully as those of their local counterparts.

While the states

formed part of the coalition of forces which successfully realized basic revenue sharing objectives, they failed to be
designated as central coordinators of programs.

By placing

local governments on an equal footing with states, the Act
denied to the latter the authority they desired.

States did.

become more entrenched in the employment and training system
with CETA, through provisions for Governors toa

act as prime

sponsors, have a voice in disbursing funds earmarked for special activities (e.g., vocational education, or •state services"), and approve the establishment of Job Corps centers.
In addition, CETA provided for participation of state agencies in the delivery system (11, pp. 42206-42219).
the effective limits on Gubernatorial authority, the

However,
M~alance

of-state" (1, p. 14) jurisdictional arrangement, and the provisions enabling the growth of local government consortia
(11, p. 42206), all indicated that states did not obtain the

1)8
clear-cut control over funding and planning which they
sought.
It was general local governments who were the big winners.

Cities and counties attained the "bottoms-up# system

of program development and operation which Canton's mayor
Cmich wanted (JJ, pp. 76-77).

They also won extension of

public employment, the consortium and special circumstances
prime sponsorship provisions (11, pp. 42206-42211), and holdharmless.

With respect to the latter, the allocation of half

the basic grant money "on the basis of the manpower allotment"
to an area for the prior fiscal year, plus the command that
the Secretary's Title I discretionary fund go (as a first
priority) for maintenance of

90~

of an area's previous amount

(11, p. 42207), while not meeting city/county demands headon, were nevertheless provisions for gradualizing the transition into CETA.

This could all be done with a direct line

of funding from the federal level.

Though both mayors and

county executives had reason to smile with CETA's passage,
the latter could claim an even greater victory than their
city hall counterparts.

This was because of the opening up

of benefits to new non-urban areas and the defeat of the
mayor's demand for a 150,000 population minimum for county
sponsorship (a county minimum of 100,000 was enacted) (30,
p.

58).
Public schools were not well rewarded in the legisla-

tion.

Their anxieties over entrusting control to general
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governments, over the fate of key categorical programs and
over the presumptive provider status of established educational agencies, proved to be based upon an accurate appraisal of the near future.

Their demand for school boards

to be recognized as separate government agencies for employment and training were not met, and neither was their demand
for guaranteed pass-through of funds from general governments to local educational bodies.

However, the outcome of

reform proceedings was not entirely negative from this perspective.

Through public employment and federal target pro-

grams, school officials could still hope to participate in
implementation under CETA.

Some provisions, for example,

one prioritizing utilization of MDTA skills centers (11, p.
42207), or the Title III authorization of programs for clients limited in the English language (11, p. 42211), hinted
at continued involvement by schools.

Nevertheless, the en-

actment of the general government prime sponsorship system,
with its implications of fostering new administrative networks, was a legislative defeat for many public school officials.
Representatives of the disadvantaged also suffered a
defeat.

CETA did not even approximate the federally-insured

categorical approach demanded by organizations affiliated
with ethnic minorities and the poverty community.

Even Title

III represented a diluted version of the approach these
groups desired.

While specifying a few programs (e.g., for
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native Americans or for limited English-speaking clients),
that Title did not specify provider organizations or define
beneficiaries sufficiently from this perspective (11, pp.
42211-42213).
objectivesa

A few provisions did address these groups'
native tribe "eligible applicant• status for

public employment (11, p. 42209), CBO •participation in"
planning under prime sponsorships (11, p. 42207), a CAA role
in Job Corps client screening (11, p. 42214).

Additionally,

the phrase•
••• to the maximum extent feasible manpower services ••• will be provided to those most in need of
them, including low-income persons and persons of
limited English-speaking ability, and that the need
for continued funding of programs of demonstrated
effectiveness is taken into account ••• (11, p. 42207),
represented a kind of admonition intended for prime sponsors
in developing plans.

Yet, the vagueness of such a phrase

epitomized the main problem with the Act from the standpoint
of the disadvantaged, and the few references which focused
on the objectives of this sector looked like token gestures
compared to what had come out of Congress in the 1960s.
Organized labor was also unsuccessful, in light of its
position favoring centralization/categorization, though CETA
did reflect labor's opinion in other ways.

The AFL-CIO de-

mand for "overall Federal control of policy, direction and
standards• (JJ, p. 489) was not even remotely approached.
Also, labor's wish for a definite role in the service and
job delivery processes went unheeded.

~

Yet, the compromise

141

nature of the bill was apparent in that two important union
proposals were enacted.

The most prominent of these was pub-

lic employment with favorable appropriation authorizations
and none of the killing restrictions which some groups wanted.
Labor also saw its position reflected in the incorporation
of desired formula factors (i.e., numbers of unemployed and
adults in low-income families) (ll, pp. 42207, 42209).
Business organizations, like state governments, were
a valuable part of the coalition which fought for basic reform but also failed to obtain the kind of bill that was preferred.

Public employment was the major setback.

The open-

ended provision enacted was not reflective of business opinion.

Beside this, CETA contained very little in the way of

promises of business participation in the system.

While

profit-making enterprises would probably end up with a role
to play, the evasive language of the Act left that role
mostly undefined.
The two stalwarts in the systems vocational schools and
the Training and Employment Service, received a rebuff in
CETA's failure to denote presumed service providers.

The Act

opened the door to possible constructions of bureaucracies
which could be alternatives to these old-line entities.

Their

objectives with respect to the governmental form of the CETA
arrangement were also ignored1

vocational schools did not

obtain equal status with local governments, and the Service's
state emphasis remained unrealized.

These bastions of

-~a.n-
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power" and training had to be content with lesser prizes
scattered throughout the Act.
ed

5• of Title

Vocational schools were award-

I appropriations (11, p. 42209).

The Act

clearly intended that MDTA skills centers be utilized •to
the extent feasible" for institutional training (11, p.
42207).

In addition, Title III federal activities included

some in which vocational schools were e.xperienced1 something
which might enhance the perceived usefulness of the schools
(11, pp. 42211-4221)).

The Training and Employment Service

was assigned duties such as inf"ormation processing, benefit
disbursement and, to a limited extent, job-placement (11,
pp. 42206-42219).

There was also a paragraph requiring state

sponsors to "provide for the coordination of programs financed under the Wagner-Peyser Act" (11, p. 42208), that is,
the law establishing the Service in 1933 (4, p. 11).

Beyond

that, the Service was left in limbo, its exact role to be
determined by the assessments of political officeholders (at
all three levels of government).
In its incorporation of such a plurality of interests,
CETA was a typical product of the American political system.
Between 1969, when the first major legislative reform proposals were made, and the bargain struck in 1973, there occurred over four years of efforts to find a compromise.

The

end result reflected the input of a broad spectrum of forces
(both ideological and socio-political), as those forces combined within a historical context.

The policy-making machin-

14)

ery in Washington was activated by interest groups with sufficient access to it, and tilted by the weight of the times.
However, CETA was also atypical in that it instituted
policy changes based on concepts (decentralization, decategorization, consolidation, comprehensiveness) with which continuation of existing grantsmanship games was incompatible.
The significance of CETA would be seen both in terms of federal assistance generally and employment and training in
particular.

It was one of the first Acts of Congress aimed

at reigning in the federal octopus which had become so overbearing in recent decades.

It was the first Act of Congress

aimed at harmonizing the many components of the national
employment and training effort in a comprehensive fashion.
No matter what the future holds, the CETA reform debate will
stand as an episode in which the basic relationships between
the United States government and its public and private constituents were called into question, and in an area of policy
which seems to become more critical as time passes.
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